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INTRODUCTION
This Article continues the trend of reviewing the veterans benefits
case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
related developments over the preceding calendar year.1 Part I
provides context for the issues raised by the cases before the Federal
Circuit in 2013. Part II of this Article reviews changes in the
1. Previous articles include James D. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues:
Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037 (2013) [hereinafter
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes]; James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar Conversation About
Rules vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1175
(2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, Changing Voices]; Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in
2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1201 (2011); and Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that
Veterans Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155 (2010). Although no
journal produces an annual review of veterans law at the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”) level, its case law until 2010 has been
examined by Michael Allen. See generally Michael P. Allen, The Law of Veterans’ Benefits
2008–2010: Significant Developments, Trends, and a Glimpse Into the Future, 3 VETERANS
L. REV. 1 (2011).
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composition of the Federal Circuit that have been ongoing since
2011. Part III contains a review of the veterans law cases decided by
the Federal Circuit in 2013. Part IV discusses some of the themes and
possible future directions raised by the cases.2 This Article concludes
with an addendum that continues the statistical look at veterans law
in the Federal Circuit.3
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 2013 VETERANS
LAW CASES

The Federal Circuit reviews final decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”). These cases
originate when claims for veterans benefits are submitted online or in
person at one of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
regional offices (“ROs”), and are processed, developed, and
adjudicated at one of those offices.4 VA will assist the veteran in
developing evidence in support of the claim, and once all evidentiary
development is deemed complete, VA will adjudicate the claim.5 If a
claim is denied, the RO will issue a Rating Decision informing the
veteran of the results of the adjudication and the underlying reasons
for the denial.6 A veteran who is dissatisfied with any part of the result
can submit a Notice of Disagreement, in which case VA will prepare a
Statement of the Case (“SOC”).7 After submitting a Notice of
Disagreement, the veteran has several options: ask for a de novo
review of the claim at the RO level; or, “perfect the appeal” by filing a
substantive appeal with the Board of Veterans’ Appeals8 (“the Board”).

2. In past years, the themes of articles have been the “changing voices in a
familiar conversation,” suggesting that under the surface of the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence lies a familiar rules-versus-standards debate reflecting different views
about what it means for the system to be “veteran friendly,” Ridgway, Changing Voices,
supra note 1, at 1176, and have “fresh eyes on persistent issues,” noting that “[w]ith a
substantially different line-up of judges, practitioners have entered the latest era of
the Federal Circuit by revisiting the fundamental role of the courts in veterans law,”
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1037–38.
3. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–63 (statistical review); Ridgway,
Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1224–33 (same); Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at
1096–1103 (same).
4. In 2013, there were fifty-six regional offices in the United States, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines. About VBA, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., http://www.benefits.va
.gov/BENEFITS/about.asp (last visited May 14, 2014).
5. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1203–10 (detailing the procedure and
Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) determinations made as part of the claim
adjudication process).
6. Id. at 1206.
7. See id.
8. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5110, 7105(d)(1) (2012).

VA.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1440

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:34 PM

[Vol. 63:1437

The Board is an internal VA body that provides review of RO
decisions within the Agency.9 It issued 34,028 decisions in 2000, but
as with the rest of VA, its workload has increased dramatically: it
issued 39,076 decisions in 2006; 43,757 decisions in 2008; 49,127
decisions in 2010; 48,588 decisions in 2011; and 44,300 decisions in
2012.10 Showcasing one of the various differences between the worlds
of civil law and veterans law, the Board—although an appellate
body—has the power to develop evidence and to find facts de novo.11
The Board must “account for the [persuasiveness of the
evidence] . . . , analyze the credibility and probative value of all
material evidence . . . , and provide the reasons for its rejection of any
such evidence.”12
Until 1988, VA was the only agency insulated by statute from
judicial review, and, due to its perceived “paternalistic” nature,13 it
was not even subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).14 In

9. Id. § 7101 (2012).
10. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 23 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 BOARD REPORT], available
at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2012AR.pdf; BD. OF
VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL
YEAR 2011, at 23 (2012), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual
_Rpts/BVA2011AR.pdf; BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.bva
.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2010AR.pdf; BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS,
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 23
(2009), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2008
AR.pdf; BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs
/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2006AR.pdf; BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 33 (2001), available
at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2000AR.pdf.
The
decrease in 2011 and 2012 was reported to be “primarily a function of a reduction in
full time equivalent (FTE) employees . . . to prepare for operating in the constrained
fiscal environment affecting the entire Federal government in Fiscal Year 2013 and
beyond.” 2012 BOARD REPORT, supra, at 4. The authors expect the Board’s
productivity to increase in 2014 due to the Board’s April 2013 announcement that it
plans to hire 100 new attorneys. See Steve Vogel, Veterans Face Another Backlog as a
Quarter-Million Appeal Disability Claims, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/politics/veterans-face-another-backlog-as-a-quarter-million-appeal-disability
-claims/2013/09/10/0078154a-15ba-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_story.html.
11. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing the
Board’s duty “to analyze the credibility and probative value of evidence”); Owens v.
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995) (stating that the Board must weigh and assess the
evidence of record).
12. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff’d per curiam, 78 F.3d 604
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
13. Steven Reiss & Matthew Tenner, Effects of Representation by Attorneys in Cases
Before VA: The “New Paternalism, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 2 (2009).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 500; see Robert Ginnane, “Rule Making,” “Adjudication” and
Exemptions Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 621–22 (1947)
(outlining the particular APA provisions to which VA is not subject).
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1988, Congress passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act,15 which
established the Veterans Court16 as an Article I court with judges
appointed for fifteen-year terms.17 The Veterans Court may decide
cases by non-precedential single-judge decisions, precedential threejudge panels, or full-court opinions.18 The Veterans Court reviews
the Board’s factual findings under a “clearly erroneous” standard,19
reviews the Board’s interpretations of statutes and regulations under
a de novo standard,20 and reviews the Board’s legal conclusions under
an “arbitrary, capricious, . . . abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” standard.21 The Veterans Court also reviews a
Board decision to determine whether it is supported by an adequate
statement of reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions.22
Whereas VA’s system is designed to be non-adversarial and
claimant-friendly, the Veterans Court is an adversarial forum.23
However, only claimants may appeal to the Veterans Court,24 which
means that the substantive law created by the court tends to “act[] as
a one-way ratchet,” with the ability to add rules that favor veterans but
a highly limited ability to create rules that favor VA.25 The forum and

15. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 38 U.S.C.).
16. The Veterans Court was originally named the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
and was renamed in the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3315, 3341.
17. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7253 (restating the codified language of the Veterans’
Judicial Review Act of 1988).
18. See id. § 7254 (restating the codified language of the Veterans’ Judicial Review
Act of 1988).
19. Hood v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 295, 299 (2009); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990) (holding that the “clearly erroneous” standard in the
Veterans’ Appeals court is the same as the standard in Article III courts: “[w]here
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous”).
20. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1) (granting the Veterans Court the authority to decide
“all relevant questions of law” and define statutory and regulatory language); see also
Lane v. Principi, 339 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (requiring the Veterans Court
to review de novo Board interpretation of a regulation); cf. Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.
App. 532, 539 (1993) (en banc) (holding that the Board’s choice of a particular
diagnostic code is subject to arbitrary and capricious standard of review because it is
a “question of the application of the law to the facts and not a question of law”.
21. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A); see also Foster v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 393, 394
(1991) (per curiam) (holding that failure to comment on a veteran’s testimony at a
hearing does not constitute “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance
with law”).
22. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).
23. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1209–10.
24. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
25. James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:
Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefit System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 251, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, New Complexities].
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procedures of the court create an odd interplay of power that also
leads to increased complexity in the laws that govern the process.26
If either side is dissatisfied with a Veterans Court decision, each
party has an appeal of right to the Federal Circuit.27 The decision by
the Veterans Court marks the first stage in the claims adjudication
process at which VA may appeal a decision.28 Although either side
may appeal from a decision of the Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit
can only review questions of law, including constitutional challenges
and, less frequently, challenges to VA rulemaking under the APA.29
One of the most important aspects of VA’s claims processing
system is that it is not only non-adversarial at the agency level, but it is
intentionally designed to be “claimant-friendly.”30 The system was
originally established as a way for a grateful nation to ensure that
those who had served in the military would be well-cared for if they
were injured.31 As such, an adversarial system made no sense because
“[t]he government’s interest in veterans cases is not that it shall win,
but rather that justice shall be done, that all veterans so entitled
receive the benefits due to them.”32
However, navigating VA claims processing system can be complex
and, as a result, has the potential to provide only a limited advantage
to veterans if it is too complicated for them to access.33 To counter
that possibility, Congress has established that VA has “the affirmative
duty to assist claimants by informing veterans of the benefits available

26. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1039, 1044–45 (discussing the focus on
procedure over factual development of cases and the paradoxical effect of trying to make
the system more veteran friendly, but actually causing severe delays in claims processing).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
28. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1210.
29. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d).
30. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011) (reiterating that the
VA’s adjudicatory process is meant to function “with a high degree of informality and
solicitude for the claimant” (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985))); Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (“Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for
those who served their country in uniform.”).
31. WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
3–5 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the early days of veterans benefits from their origins in
Sir Francis Drake’s victory over the Spanish Armada to their role in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), to 1988, when the benefits began to be
viewed as more than “mere gratuities”); see also Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds:
Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 303, 308–09 (2004) (describing the origins of the modern veterans benefits).
32. Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
33. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1044–45 (discussing complexity); see
DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (2011) (Lance, J., concurring) (“There is an
unfortunate—and not entirely unfounded—belief that veterans law is becoming too
complex for the thousands of regional office adjudicators that must apply the rules
on the front lines in over a million cases per year.”).
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to them and assisting them in developing claims they may have,”34
including obtaining records under governmental control,35 assisting
the veteran in obtaining private records,36 and providing the veteran
with a medical opinion if one is necessary to decide the claim.37
Another important aspect of VA’s duty to assist is to read a
plaintiff’s pleadings “sympathetically” to “‘determine all potential
claims raised by the evidence,’” regardless of how those claims are
labeled in the application for benefits.38 Furthermore, various legal
presumptions make it easier for veterans to prove certain types of
claims by eliminating the key requirement that they submit evidence
of a connection between their disability and their military service.39
Veterans law uses a lower burden of proof than other areas of the
law,40 as well as radically different procedural standards.41 For
34. Jaquay, 304 F.3d at 1280 (“Congress recently passed the Veterans Claims
Assistance Act of 2000 ‘to reaffirm and clarify the duty of the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs to assist claimants for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary . . . .’”
(omission in original) (citation omitted)); see also Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362,
1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the duty of the Board to assist veterans or
those making claims on their behalf and declaring this duty antecedent to ensuring
that all issues are properly raised on appeal).
35. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b)(3) (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(2), (e) (2013).
36. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(e); see also Loving v. Nicholson, 19
Vet. App. 96, 102 (2005) (holding that the duty to assist requires VA to “make
reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining [relevant] evidence” (quoting 38
U.S.C. § 5103A(a),(b))).
37. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d); see Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991)
(requiring a “thorough and contemporaneous medical examination” that also takes
into account past medical records); see also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79,
80–83 (2006) (discussing the four elements needed to trigger the duty).
38. Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Cook v.
Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 7104(a), (d)(1); Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008) (“[T]he
Board is required to consider all issues raised either by the claimant or by the
evidence of record . . . .” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
39. For example, veterans who served in Vietnam are generally presumed to have
been exposed to Agent Orange and thus do not have to present evidence of an injury
or event that occurred during service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). In addition,
certain types of disabilities are also presumed to be connected to a veteran’s
presumptive exposure to Agent Orange, thus eliminating, in those cases, the
requirement that a veteran submit evidence of a causal connection between the
disability and an in-service injury or event. See id. §§ 1116(a), 3.307(a)(6), 3.309(e).
Chronic diseases and certain tropical diseases can also be automatically serviceconnected. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1101(3) (chronic diseases); id. § 1112(a)(2)
(tropical diseases); id. § 1133 (presumptions for tropical diseases); see also 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.307(a)(4) (tropical diseases); id. § 3.309(a) (chronic diseases); id. § 3.309(b)
(tropical diseases).
40. The “benefit of the doubt” doctrine is unique to veterans law, and dictates that a
claim will be granted if the evidence for and against the claim is in “relative equipoise”
and will only be denied if a fair preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See 38
U.S.C. § 5107(b) (“When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative
evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary
shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49,
55 (1990) (likening the benefit of the doubt rule to “the rule deeply embedded in

VA.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1444

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:34 PM

[Vol. 63:1437

example, a veteran can continue to submit information during the
pendency of a claim and, if this happens, the claim can be delayed
while the RO re-assesses and re-adjudicates in order to issue an
updated decision to the veteran.42 In addition, although a decision
may be deemed “final” if a veteran fails to appeal within the
prescribed time period, there are several ways to challenge a decision
even if it has become “final.”43 In many ways, there is no such thing
as finality in a veterans case.44
Despite its intentionally “veteran-friendly” design, the system for
processing veterans benefits claims has, by all accounts, been
functioning inadequately for decades.45
VA is a vast and
extraordinarily complex bureaucracy that has grown organically
through the incorporation of three separate agencies in the more
than eighty years since it was created.46 As a result, its current
processes are often coincidences of history rather than the result of
planning or design. Nowhere is this clearer than in VA’s disability
compensation claims processing system, including the patchwork of
statutes and regulations that govern the system.47 The system may be
sandlot baseball folklore that ‘the tie goes to the runner’”); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (stating that
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the claimant).
41. See, e.g., James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L.
REV. 113, 115–16 (2009) [hereinafter Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?] (explaining
that, unlike causes of action in other contexts, veterans benefits claims typically arise
years after the individual stops serving in the military, which causes incredibly
complicated factual scenarios).
42. Id. at 126.
43. Id. at 128.
44. See id. at 126 (suggesting that, if the veteran continues to submit new
evidence then his claim can be re-adjudicated over the span of several years before
the Board is able to rule on the appeal).
45. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-118660, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
USED BY THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION’S DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE IN ASSISTING
VETERANS 1, 6–8, 10–11 (1974) (investigating complaints that the telephones were
constantly busy, veterans’ calls were being routed on a “haphazard” basis, and there
were excessive delays in resolving problems); Duncan D. Hunter & Peter Hegseth,
Editorial, The VA Needs a New Leader, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2013, at A17
(recommending Secretary Shinseki resign so another appointee can resolve VA’s
struggle with slow claims processing).
46. The three agencies are the Veterans Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions of the
Interior Department, and the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.
History—VA History, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory
.asp (last visited May 14, 2014).
47. James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135, 145 (2011); see, e.g.,
William F. Fox, Jr., Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339, 339 (2004); Reynolds Holding, Insult to Injury, LEGAL AFF.
March–April 2005, at 26, 27; James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the
Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed To Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223,
224 (2001); see also An Examination of Poorly Performing U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Reg’l
Offices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs of the H.
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overburdened but the laws and regulations that govern it are also
becoming increasingly complex.48 The increased complexity leads to
inaccuracy:
claims decisions made across the system have a
historically low accuracy rate.49 This poor accuracy rate leads to lost
or improperly granted benefits, which in turn leads to a repeating
process of appeals and remands.
Despite its stated good intentions, VA has continually failed to make
headway against the backlog of benefits claims.50 The bases of these
problems are multiple and systemic.51 One problem is that some of the
principles underlying the veterans benefits system—that is, that the
system should be pro-claimant and thus completely unique from
underlying mainstream legal principles—have essentially required that
the law of veterans benefits develop in relative isolation, even after the
establishment of judicial review in 1988.52
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112 Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Gerald T. Manar,
Deputy Director, National Veterans Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United
States) (“[M]ost people within [VA’s claims processing system] want to do a good
job. However, conditions beyond their individual control keep them from achieving
consistently good work.”). See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07562-T, PROCESSING OF CLAIMS CONTINUES TO PRESENT CHALLENGES 3 (2007)
(explaining that several factors are continuing to create challenges for VA’s claims,
including increased claims filed by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-749T, CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS
PERSIST AND MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT MAY BE DIFFICULT 3 (2005) (stating
that VA’s disability programs have not been updated to reflect the current state of
science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions); Jonathan Goldstein,
Note, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial Review . . . Slowly!, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 889, 895 (1989) (discussing the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)).
48. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1044–45, 1094.
49. Adjudicating VA’s Most Complex Disability Claims: Ensuring Quality, Accuracy, and
Consistency on Complicated Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance &
Mem’l Affairs of the H. Comm. On Veterans’ Affairs, 113 Cong. 2–3 (2013) (statement of
Zach Hearn, Deputy Director for Claims, The American Legion), available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/VR/VR09/20131204/101539/HHRG-113-VR09-Wstate
-HearnZ-20131204.pdf (noting that a recent American Legion survey found errors in
55% of 260 claims that were reviewed).
50. See Hunter & Hegseth, supra note 45 (noting that a recent study showed that
wait times are approximately one year for a claim to process, lagging by as much as
600 days in New York or Los Angeles).
51. In addition to an increasing number of claims submitted and the historically
poor accuracy rates at some ROs, the structure of the adjudication system itself is
based on antiquated premises. For example, the diagnostic codes are based on
medical principles that are decades out of date. James D. Ridgway, Lessons the
Veterans Benefits System Must Learn on Gathering Expert Witness Evidence, 18 FED. CIR. B.J.
405, 424 (2009). Another problem that must be addressed is the need for VA to
develop “new, robust evidence-gathering procedures.” Id. at 406.
52. On November 18, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the Veterans’
Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988), which established the
U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals. Pursuant to the Veterans Programs Enhancement
Act of 1998, effective March 1, 1999, the court’s name was changed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims. See Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3315, 3341.
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Criticism of VA’s claims processing system increased in 2013. A
February 2013 audit by VA’s Office of Inspector General, which was
completed while reviewing the Agency’s transition to a paperless
environment, stated that while the new system could not be
completely evaluated because of its incremental implementation, it
nonetheless had “system performance issues,” lacked a detailed plan
for the “scanning and digitization of veterans’ claims,” and would
continue to face challenges in “eliminating the backlog of disability
claims by 2015.”53 In March 2013, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued a report entitled Veterans’ Disability Benefits:
Challenges to Timely Processing Persist.54 It concluded that
the extent to which VA is positioned to meet its ambitious
processing timeliness goal remains uncertain . . . . [A]t the time of
our review, [VA] could not provide us with a plan that met
established criteria for sound planning, such as articulating
performance measures for each initiative, including their intended
impact on the claims backlog.55

On March 19, 2013, Representative Jeff Miller, chair of the House
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, criticized VA leadership for “a lack
of transparency, lengthening delays and a [greatly increased] number
of veterans disability claims.”56 Despite the turmoil, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, Eric Shinseki, continues to stand behind the goal he
established in 2010: that, by 2015, the Agency will have eliminated
the disability claims backlog and will be processing all claims with an
accuracy rate of 98%.57
The veterans benefits system was designed to be non-adversarial
and “claimant-friendly,” and its procedures are intended to reflect
this aim.58 There may be many disagreements about how to achieve
53. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., 11-04376-81, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF TRANSITION TO A
PAPERLESS CLAIMS PROCESSING ENVIRONMENT 2 (2013).
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-453T, VETERANS’ DISABILITY
BENEFITS: CHALLENGES TO TIMELY PROCESSING PERSIST 2 (2013).
55. Id.
56. Aaron Glantz, House Committee Leader Calls for Head of VA Benefits To Resign,
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (May 19, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports
/house-committee-leader-calls-head-va-benefits-resign-4302.
57. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs FY 2012 Budget for the Veterans Benefits
Administration, National Cemetery Administration, and Related Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs,
112 Cong. 27–28 (2011) (statement of Michael Walcoff, Acting Under Secretary for
Benefits, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).
However, it is currently far from meeting this target. Id. at 1–2 (statement of Jon
Runyan, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Disability
Assistance and Memorial Affairs for the Committee on Veterans Affairs).
58. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1186–87 (describing the multifaceted meaning of “veteran friendly”).
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this goal, but a dysfunctional system is not “veteran-friendly” by any
definition.
It is within this context of increased regulatory
complexity, criticism from oversight organizations, and tension about
what it means for the system to be “veteran friendly,” that the Federal
Circuit issued its precedential veterans law cases in 2013.
II. ONGOING TRANSITIONS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Since 2011, the composition of the Federal Circuit has continued
to change significantly after years of relative stability. In 2011, three
judges left the court, two assumed senior status, and three new judges
were confirmed.59 In 2012, Judge Richard Linn assumed senior
status, creating another vacant seat on the court.60
The court’s composition continued to change in 2013. On January
7, 2013, Judge William Curtis Bryson assumed senior status, creating
an additional vacancy.61 On February 7, 2013, Raymond T. Chen and
Todd M. Hughes were nominated to the two remaining vacancies on
the Federal Circuit.62 On March 15, 2013, sixteen months after his
nomination,63 Judge Richard G. Taranto was confirmed and began
active service on the court.64 Judge Taranto, an intellectual property
59. Id. at 1177–80; see also Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1038 n.1 (“In 2011,
the Federal Circuit saw the retirement of Chief Judge Paul Michel, the deaths of
Judge Daniel M. Friedman and Judge Glenn Archer, and the assumption of senior
status by Judge Haldane Robert Mayer and Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa. Several of these
judges, who were veterans themselves, were replaced by new judges with perspectives
outside of veterans law.” (citation omitted)). The Veterans Court underwent
significant transitions in 2012 and 2013 as well. The number of active judges on the
Veterans Court has increased from six to nine with the confirmations of Coral Wong
Pietsch, Margaret Bartley, and William S. Greenberg. See Judge Coral W. Pietsch, U.S.
CT. APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/pietsch.php (last
visited May 5, 2014); Judge Margaret Bartley, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/bartley.php (last visited May 5, 2014); Judge William S.
Greenberg, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/green
berg.php (last visited May 5, 2014).
60. Circuit Judge Linn To Assume Senior Status on November 4, 2012, U.S. CT. APPEALS
FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2012/circuit-judge-linn-to-assume-senior
-status-on-november-1-2012.html (last visited May 6, 2014).
61. Circuit Judge Bryson Assumed Senior Status on January 7, 2013, U.S. CT. APPEALS
FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2013/circuit-judge-bryson-assumed-senior
-status-on-january-7-2013.html (last visited May 6, 2014).
62. President Obama Nominates Two To Serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter President Obama Federal Circuit
Nominees], http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/07/president-obama
-nominates-two-serve-us-court-appeals-federal-circuit.
63. Judge Taranto was nominated on November 10, 2011, to fill the then-final
vacancy on the court. See President Obama Nominates Richard Gary Taranto To Serve on
the U.S. Court of Appeals, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2011/11/10/president-obama-nominates-richard-gary-taranto-serve
-us-court-appeals.
64. See Todd Ruger, After 17 Months, Senate Confirms New Federal Circuit Judge, BLOG
LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013, 6:13 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/03
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specialist and experienced U.S. Supreme Court advocate,65 authored
his first published veterans law opinion on October 10, 2013, in
Tyrues v. Shinseki.66
Judge Chen was confirmed on August 1, 2013, after a career in
intellectual property litigation.67 Finally, on September 24, 2013, Judge
Hughes was confirmed as the final member of the Federal Circuit.68
Judge Hughes has an extensive background in commercial litigation,
including a career at the U.S. Department of Justice where he handled
matters of federal personnel law, veterans benefits, international trade,
and government contracts.69 His unanimous confirmation also set a
historic precedent as he became the first openly gay judge to serve on a
federal court of appeals.70 Neither Judge Chen nor Judge Hughes
authored any veterans law opinions in 2013.
III. THE 2013 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
This Part considers the veterans law cases decided by the Federal
Circuit in 2013. The Federal Circuit issued twenty-one precedential
decisions on veterans law in 2013,71 significantly more than the
sixteen precedential decisions issued in 2012,72 almost double the
number of precedential decisions issued in 2011,73 and considerably
more than the fourteen precedential decisions issued in 2010.74
The Federal Circuit’s review of Veterans Court decisions is limited
by statute.75 The court has “exclusive jurisdiction to review and
decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any
/after-17-months-senate-confirms-new-federal-circuit-judge.html.
65. President Obama Federal Circuit Nominees, supra note 62.
66. 732 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
67. See Todd Ruger, Senate Confirms New Federal Circuit Judge, BLOG LEGAL TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2013 12:32 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/08/senate-confirms
-new-federal-circuit-judge.html.
68. Todd Ruger, Senate Confirms First Openly Gay Appeals Judge, BLOG LEGAL TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/senate-confirms
-first-openly-gay-appeals-judge.html.
69. Id.
70. See Kathryn Ruemmler, Senate Votes To Confirm Todd Hughes To Serve on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/09/24/senate-votes-confirm-todd-hughes-serve
-united-states-court-appeals-federal-circuit.
71. The Federal Circuit also issued published opinions on two Veterans Court
decisions on attorney fee petitions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b) (2012). See Wagner v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Cameron
v. Shinseki, 721 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, this Article does not discuss
these cases because they do not pertain to the law governing veterans benefits.
72. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1055.
73. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1190.
74. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1220–21.
75. 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
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interpretation thereof [by the Veterans Court], and to interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and
necessary to a decision.”76 Therefore, except for constitutional issues,
the Federal Circuit may only review issues of law and has no power to
resolve any factual matters that arose in a case decided by the
Veterans Court.77 Presented here, the cases are organized by relevant
issues and in the order that they would be heard during the benefits
review process.
A. Scope of Judicial Review
The Federal Circuit’s precedential veterans law decisions from
2012 were exceptional in that fully half of them concerned “issues
related to the rules of judicial review applied by the courts, rather
than disputes about the substance of veterans law.”78 This year, while
the Federal Circuit maintained some focus on these issues, they did
not comprise an overwhelming portion of the court’s total
precedential decisions.
1.

The Veterans Court’s jurisdictional limits
In Kyhn v. Shinseki,79 the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans
Court acted beyond its jurisdiction, both by relying on evidence not
in the record before the Board and by engaging in fact finding in the
first instance.80 The Veterans Court has exclusive jurisdiction “to
review decisions of the Board . . . on the record of the proceedings
before the Secretary and the Board.”81 This jurisdiction is limited by
38 U.S.C. § 7261, which provides that the Veterans Court may review
“questions of law de novo, questions of fact for clear error, and
certain other issues under the ‘arbitrary, capricious, abuse of
discretion, [or] not otherwise in accordance with law’ standard.”82
The Veterans Court is expressly prohibited from “making factual

76. Id. § 7292(c).
77. Id. § 7292(d)(1); see also Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1345–47 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting this limitation on the court’s jurisdiction to review
factual determinations).
78. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1055–56.
79. 716 F.3d 572 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
80. Id. at 575, 577.
81. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a)–(b); see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1212
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[T]he Veterans Court reviews each case that comes
before it on a record that is limited to the record developed before the RO and the
Board.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131
S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
82. Garrison v. Nicholson, 494 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 38 U.S.C.
§ 7261(a)).
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findings in the first instance”83 and from reviewing de novo any
findings of fact made by the Board.84
In this case, the veteran, Arnold C. Kyhn, was denied disability
benefits for tinnitus after he failed to attend a VA medical
examination.85 Before the Veterans Court, Mr. Kyhn argued—for the
first time—that there was good cause for his failure to attend the
examination because VA had never provided him with notice that the
examination had been scheduled.86 The Veterans Court applied the
presumption of regularity and presumed that notice had been
received and affirmed the Board’s denial of benefits.87 However, in
determining whether the presumption of regularity applied in this
case, the Veterans Court did not rely on previously published
materials.88 Instead, the court ordered the Secretary to provide
information about VA’s regular process for informing veterans that
examinations had been scheduled.89 In response, the Secretary
submitted affidavits from two VA employees describing the
scheduling process, to the best of their knowledge.90 Relying on this
information, the Veterans Court held that the presumption of
regularity applied, presumed that Mr. Kyhn had received notification
of the missed examination, and affirmed the Board’s denial of
benefits.91 Mr. Kyhn submitted a motion for rehearing and full court
review, arguing that the panel had improperly relied on evidence
from outside the record before the Board.92 The motion was denied,
although two judges dissented on the basis that the full court should
address the issue.93
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the case “raises the legal
question of whether the Veterans Court acted beyond its jurisdiction
when it relied on evidence not in the record before the Board and
engaged in first-instance fact finding.”94 The Federal Circuit rejected
83. Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
84. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
85. Kyhn, 716 F.3d at 573–74; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (2013) (allowing the
Board to rate a claim based on the evidence of record if a veteran fails to attend a
scheduled examination).
86. Kyhn, 716 F.3d at 574.
87. Id.
88. See id. (relying solely on the Secretary’s reports).
89. Id.
90. Id. The two affidavits seemed to provide conflicting information, and only
one affidavit contained information from a VA employee claiming to have personal
knowledge of the process. Id. at 574 & n.2. That employee’s affidavit, however,
seemed to have been internally inconsistent. Id. at 576 n.6.
91. Id. at 574.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 574–75.
94. Id. at 575.
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the Secretary’s argument that Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence authorized the Veterans Court to take judicial notice of
VA’s notification procedures.95 The Federal Circuit noted that the
Veterans Court had relied in the past on Rule 201 to justify
consideration of extra-record materials.96 However, the Federal
Circuit described the affidavits in question as “evidentiary in nature”
and distinguished them from sources that are “generally known” and
“whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”97
The Federal Circuit also held that the Veterans Court erred by
engaging in fact finding in the first instance when it relied on the
extra-record affidavits to find that “VA does have an established
procedure for notifying claimants of [VA] examinations.”98 The
Federal Circuit rejected the Veterans Court’s explanation that it
“considered the affidavits solely ‘[a]s part of the de novo process for
determining whether the presumption of regularity attaches.’”99
Again, the Federal Circuit relied on the evidentiary nature of the
affidavits rather than situations “where the presumption of regularity
was premised upon independent legal authority.”100 The majority
noted that the Veterans Court was unable to conclude that VA had a
regular notification practice without weighing and evaluating the
affidavits, which constituted fact finding in the first instance.101
Therefore, the court concluded: “The Veterans Court’s application
of the presumption of regularity to this factual finding does not
convert the underlying finding into a legal conclusion.”102
Judge Lourie, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority’s
conclusions that the Veterans Court erred when requesting
information from VA about its regular practice for notifying veterans
regarding medical examinations and that the Veterans Court had
engaged in prohibited fact finding in the first instance when it
determined that Mr. Kyhn received notification of the examination
he missed.103 Judge Lourie noted that, under 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b),
“[t]he Veterans Court has jurisdiction over a number of areas of
seemingly first-instance factual inquiry that were not ‘on the record
of the proceedings before the Secretary and the Board.’”104 Judge
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 576 n.5 (citing D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008)).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577 (quoting Kyhn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 228, 234 (2011) (per curiam)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kyhn, 24 Vet. App. at 233–34).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 578 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
Id. at 578–79.
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Lourie concluded that the Veterans Court had not erred in
requesting or relying on the affidavits in this case because, “[a]s with
jurisdictional matters, evidence regarding regularity is not used to
adjudicate the merits of a claim [but, rather,] is only used to establish
whether a presumption of regularity attaches.”105 Judge Lourie noted
that he believed the prohibition in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) against de novo
review by the Veterans Court concerning factual findings by the Board
was inapplicable because, in this case, the veteran had never raised the
issue of non-receipt of notification until he was before the Veterans
Court; thus, the Board never had the opportunity to make any factual
findings on the matter.106 Finally, Judge Lourie observed that, although
the Federal Circuit considered the question of the presumption of
regularity to be a matter of application of law to facts, it was “the longstanding practice” of the Veterans Court to consider the question as a
matter of law, and therefore to apply de novo review.107
2.

The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review questions of fact
In Prinkey v. Shinseki,108 the Federal Circuit addressed its jurisdiction to
assess the adequacy of medical evidence used to sever an award of
benefits based on service connection.109 Robert D. Prinkey was a
Vietnam veteran who was diagnosed with diabetes in 1996.110 In 2003,
he submitted a claim for VA disability benefits for his diabetes and
related conditions.111 He asserted that he had been exposed to Agent
Orange (“AO”) in Vietnam and was therefore entitled to the legal
presumption of service connection for diabetes—a disease previously
established as statistically correlated to AO exposure.112 In June 2003, a
VA medical examiner concluded that Mr. Prinkey’s diabetes “[could] be
VA granted service
related to the Agent Orange exposure.”113
connection for Mr. Prinkey’s diabetes as secondary to AO exposure and
for other disabilities secondary to the service-connected diabetes.114
In April 2006, VA conducted a medical examination to determine
whether Mr. Prinkey was eligible for benefits as a result of having his
employability severely impaired.115 The nurse practitioner who
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 578, 580.
Id. at 580.
735 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1378.
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conducted the examination reviewed Mr. Prinkey’s full claims file
and discovered information that had not been available to previous
examiners: that Mr. Prinkey had surgery in 1994 to remove his
pancreas.116 Such an operation would most likely cause inadequate
insulin secretion, and the nurse practitioner concluded that “it is
more likely than not that the diabetes . . . resulted from the
pancreatectomy” instead of exposure to AO.117 An endocrinologist
reviewed the case and concluded that “[Mr. Prinkey’s] pancreatic
failure and pancreatic resection [had] nothing to do with Agent
Orange exposure.”118 Based on the above opinions, VA proposed and
implemented severance of service connection for Mr. Prinkey’s
diabetes and the other disabilities secondary to his diabetes,
including his claim for benefits based on unemployability.119
Mr. Prinkey appealed this decision, and the Board eventually
upheld the decision, finding that the June 2003 examination, on
which the grant of service connection was based, was inadequate
because the examiner did not have sufficient facts to come to an
accurate conclusion about whether Mr. Prinkey’s diabetes was linked
to his military service.120 Therefore, the Board concluded that VA
had established clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) in the 2003
decision that originally granted service connection for diabetes.121
Mr. Prinkey appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that the Board
had engaged in impermissible weighing of evidence when it found the
2003 medical examination inadequate.122 He argued that the April
2006 opinions, on which severance of service connection was based,
failed to consider a 2001 CT scan and were not supported by an
adequate rationale explaining the decision.123 The Veterans Court
affirmed the Board, noting that the information in the 2001 CT scan
was duplicated in other documents available to the examiners and that
all opinions were supported by an adequate rationale.124
Mr. Prinkey appealed to the Federal Circuit, directly challenging
the adequacy of the April 2006 medical opinions that led to the
severance of his service-connected disability benefits.125 However, the
Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Clevenger,
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1377, 1379.
Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82.
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compared the situation to numerous other cases in which it had
declined to judge the sufficiency of a medical opinion because the
issue of whether a medical opinion is adequate is a question of fact
and, therefore, beyond the court’s jurisdictional reach.126 Judge
Clevenger therefore concluded that the Federal Circuit did not have
jurisdiction to review the facts underlying an assessment of CUE by
the Veterans Court.127
B. Informal Claims
VA regulations provide that “[a]ny communication or action,
indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits . . . from a
claimant . . . may be considered an informal claim. Such [an]
informal claim must identify the benefit sought.”128 The key inquiries
in determining whether a written communication or action qualifies
as an informal claim are (1) whether there is an indication of intent
to apply for one or more benefits, and (2) whether the claimant has
identified the benefit sought.129 Moreover, “VA has a duty to fully
and sympathetically develop a . . . claim to its optimum” by
“determin[ing] all potential claims raised by the evidence [and]
applying all relevant laws and regulations.”130
1.

When pro se filings raise an informal claim
In Harris v. Shinseki,131 the Federal Circuit explained that the legal
standard establishing VA’s “duty . . . to generously construe the
evidence” to determine all potentially raised claims before deciding a
claim on the merits, is distinct from its duty to consider whether the
benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine applies after assessing the evidence of
record during the merits adjudication.132 In a decision authored by
Judge Plager, the court reviewed a trio of precedential cases

126. Id. at 1377, 1383.
127. Id. at 1383. The court concluded that the veteran’s other two arguments—
that the Veterans Court misconstrued 38 C.F.R. § 3.015(d) and that his constitutional
rights were violated—were without merit. Id. at 1383–84.
128. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2013); see also id. § 3.1(p) (defining a claim as “a formal
or informal communication in writing requesting a determination of entitlement or
evidencing a belief in entitlement[] to a benefit”).
129. Reeves v. Shinseki, 682 F.3d 988, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2012); accord Ellington v.
Nicholson, 22 Vet. App. 141, 145 (2007), aff’d, 541 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
130. Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
131. 704 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
132. Id. at 948–49; see also infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine).
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establishing that documents filed by pro se appellants must be read
and construed liberally.133 The court stated:
In Roberson, we held that the VA has a duty to fully develop any
filing made by a pro se veteran by determining all potential claims
raised by the evidence. We reiterated this requirement in Szemraj,
when we stated that the VA must generously construe a pro se
veteran’s filing to discern all possible claims raised by the evidence.
Finally, in Moody, we held that any ambiguity in a pro se filing that
could be construed as an informal claim must be resolved in the
veteran’s favor.134

The court clarified that VA’s duty to liberally read and construe a
pro se veteran’s pleadings “stems from the ‘uniquely pro-claimant’
character of the veterans’ benefits system and requires VA ‘to fully
and sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum before
deciding it on the merits.’”135 In contrast, the benefit-of-the-doubt
doctrine “assists the VA in deciding a veteran’s claim on the merits
after the claim has been fully developed.”136
The court concluded that, although the Board stated that it had
considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine, neither the Board nor
the Veterans Court had considered or discussed the relevant case law,
nor acknowledged in any way that VA had a duty to generously
construe the evidence and determine whether any informal claims
were raised.137 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans
Court decision and remanded the matter for further consideration.138
2.

When medical records raise a claim for an increased disability evaluation
In Massie v. Shinseki,139 the Federal Circuit addressed when a
medical report may raise an informal claim for an increased disability
evaluation.140 In general, the effective date for an award of benefits
“shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be
earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.”141 An

133. Harris, 704 F.3d at 948.
134. Id. (citing Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Szemraj v.
Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
135. Id. (quoting Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384).
136. Id. (emphasis added); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012) (“When there is an
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material
to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to
the claimant.”).
137. Harris, 704 F.3d at 948.
138. Id. at 949.
139. 724 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
140. Id. at 1328.
141. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2013).
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exception to this general rule occurs in a claim for increased
compensation.142 An effective date for such a claim may date back to
one year before the formal application for increase, but only if it is
factually “ascertainable that an increase in disability had occurred”
within that time frame.143 However, when service connection has
already been established, the date of a “report of [VA] examination
or hospitalization . . . will be accepted as the date of receipt of a
claim” that a medical condition has increased in severity.144
Veteran Terrance D. Massie received service-connected disability
compensation for varicose veins and related surgery, initially
evaluated as 10% disabling and then increased to 50% disabling as of
March 1990.145 On April 4, 2001, Mr. Massie requested another
increased disability evaluation by submitting a May 1999 letter from a
VA physician who stated that the veteran’s “chronic venous
insufficiency” had not improved despite surgical treatment and that
Mr. Massie experienced “significant pain” as a result.146 Based on this
letter and other evidence, VA re-evaluated the venous condition as
100% disabling, effective April 4, 2001—the date Mr. Massie
submitted his request for an increased disability evaluation.147
Mr. Massie disagreed with the assigned effective date and argued
that, based on the May 1999 physician’s letter, his condition should
be evaluated as 100% disabling as of April 4, 2000—a year before his
formal request for an increase—based on 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) and
38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2), which permit an effective date up to one year
before the filing of a claim.148 The Board disagreed, noting that the
physician’s letter in question was dated more than one year before
the request for increase was submitted and that it only reflected
treatment for Mr. Massie’s ongoing, chronic disability.149
Mr. Massie appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing for the first
time that the Board should have analyzed whether the May 1999
physician’s letter was an informal claim under 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.157(b)(1) and that it would therefore support an effective date of

142. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(1).
143. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2); see also Gaston v. Shinseki, 605 F.3d 979, 983 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (stating that § 5110(b)(2) only permits an earlier effective date for
increased disability compensation if that disability occurred within one year before
filing a claim); Harper v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 125, 126 (1997) (quoting § 5110(b)(2)
to support the same proposition); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (same).
144. 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1).
145. Massie v. Shinseki, 724 F.3d 1325, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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May 1999 for his increased disability evaluation.150 The Veterans
Court’s decision extensively analyzed whether it should remand the
matter to the Board to consider Mr. Massie’s new argument in the
first instance,151 but eventually concluded that it could review the case
on the merits to determine whether the Board had erred by failing to
consider a matter that was “reasonably raised” by the record.152 The
Veterans Court concluded that the physician’s letter did not
reasonably raise the question of an increased disability evaluation:
the letter was not a “report of examination” under 38 C.F.R
§ 3.157(b)(1) “because it (1) did not describe the results of a
‘specific, particular examination’ and (2) did not suggest that
Massie’s condition had worsened.”153
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Massie argued that the
Veterans Court interpreted § 3.157(b)(1) too narrowly by requiring a
physician’s letter to refer to a specific examination and to explicitly
state that the medical condition in question had worsened.154 In a
decision authored by Judge Lourie, the court reviewed the language
of the regulation and agreed with the Veterans Court’s
interpretation.155 Judge Lourie noted that the Veterans Court had
also reviewed VA’s internal guidelines, as set forth in the Veterans
Benefits Administration Adjudication Procedures Manual (“M21-1MR”),
which lists eight factors for VA to use when determining if a medical
report should be considered an informal claim under
§ 3.157(b)(1).156 Like the Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit,
through Judge Lourie, agreed that “for a medical record to qualify as
a ‘report of examination’ under § 3.157(b)(1), it could be far less
detailed” than required by the M21-1MR.157 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the Veterans Court decision and concluded that the lower

150. See id. (arguing that the physician’s letter from 1999 was the date of the
report of examination under 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1) and that that date should be
accepted as the date of receipt of the claim).
151. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
the Veterans Court has discretion to hear newly raised arguments on appeal or to
invoke the exhaustion doctrine, which requires a claimant to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies before appearing before the court, and remand the matter
to the Board for initial consideration of the newly raised arguments).
152. Massie, 724 F.3d at 1327 (citing Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1328–29.
155. Id. at 1326, 1328–29.
156. Id. at 1329 n.1 (referring to VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, M2-12-1, ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES, available at http://www.benefits
.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1mr1.asp).
157. Id.
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court did not err in interpreting the regulatory requirements for an
informal claim for increased benefits based on a medical report.158
C. VA’s Duty To Assist the Veteran
In 2013, the Federal Circuit decided three cases addressing the
scope of VA’s duty to assist veterans by providing a medical
examination and opinion.159 VA’s duty is codified in 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103A, which requires VA to “make reasonable efforts to assist a
claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the
claimant’s claim”160 and to obtain a medical opinion when it is
necessary to decide a claim.161
1.

The presumption of regularity when choosing who renders a medical opinion
In Parks v. Shinseki,162 the Federal Circuit held that a veteran had
waived his right to rebut the presumption that VA had properly
chosen a nurse practitioner to provide competent medical evidence
because, even though he was pro se at the time, he had not raised any
objection that challenged the presumption of regularity until his
claim was before the Veterans Court.163 Pro se veteran Arnold J.
Parks’s claim for service-connected disability compensation was
denied by a VA RO.164 The Board upheld the decision, in part
because the only competent medical evidence on the record was an
opinion from an advanced registered nurse practitioner (“ARNP”)
who stated that it was “less likely than not” that Mr. Parks’s medical
conditions were connected to his military service.165
Mr. Parks retained counsel and appealed to the Veterans Court
where he argued, for the first time, that the ARNP’s report was not
“competent medical evidence” under 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1).166
Rather than remanding to the Board so that it could consider the
ARNP’s qualifications, the Veterans Court held, as a matter of law,
that a nurse practitioner is capable of providing a competent medical
opinion.167

158. Id. at 1329.
159. Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Parks v. Shinseki, 716
F.3d 581 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
160. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) (2012).
161. Id. § 5103A(d)(1).
162. 716 F.3d 581 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
163. Id. at 585–86.
164. Id. at 582.
165. Id. at 583.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Cox v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 563, 569 (2007)).
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he presumption is
not whether all nurse practitioners are qualified to give any medical
opinion because of how the dictionary defines their capabilities.”168
Rather, the court found that the issue before it was “whether Mr.
Parks waived his right to overcome the presumption that the
selection of a particular medical professional means that the person
is qualified for the task.”169 The court cited Sickels v. Shinseki170 for the
proposition that “[i]n the case of competent medical evidence, . . .
VA benefits from a presumption that it has properly chosen a person
who is qualified to provide a medical opinion in a particular case.”171
The court explained that, “[v]iewed correctly, the presumption is not
about the person or a job title; it is about the process.”172
As to whether the presumption had been rebutted, the Federal
Circuit declined to comment on the factual matter of whether an
ARNP with the qualifications in this case was qualified to opine on
the matter at hand.173 However, the court noted that, even when a
veteran is proceeding pro se, the first step in rebutting the
presumption is to actually raise an objection.174 It rejected Mr.
Parks’s argument that, under Comer v. Peake,175 the record should be
construed sympathetically in his favor because he was pro se when he
initially filed his claim.176 The court distinguished Comer, in which the
pro se veteran had advanced arguments that could sympathetically be
read as asserting an earlier effective date for a higher disability
evaluation, from the case at hand, in which Mr. Parks had raised no
objection whatsoever to the nurse practitioner until he was no longer
pro se and was proceeding before the Veterans Court with counsel.177
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
Veterans Court.178
This case demonstrates that there are necessarily limits to the
procedural aspects of the system that make it claimant friendly. The
Federal Circuit set a limit—or perhaps simply reiterated an obvious
limit—to the sympathetic reading doctrine when it observed: “[I]t is
one thing to read a record sympathetically, as required by Comer; it is
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 584.
Id.
643 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Parks, 716 F.3d at 585 (citing Sickels, 643 F.3d at 1366).
Id.
Id. at 585–86.
Id. at 585.
552 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Parks, 716 F.3d at 586.
Id.
Id.

VA.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1460

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:34 PM

[Vol. 63:1437

quite another to read into the record an argument that had never
been made.”179
2.

Claimant’s right to an opinion from a specific VA physician
In Beasley v. Shinseki,180 the Federal Circuit clarified that a
veteran’s right to receive a VA medical opinion to assist in the
adjudication of a claim does not include the right to a medical
opinion from a VA provider of the veteran’s own choosing.181
Veteran Johnnie H. Beasley was awarded service-connected disability
benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was
initially evaluated as 30% disabling, effective July 1990.182 After
further adjudication, the Board assigned an earlier effective date of
July 1987 and directed the RO to obtain a retrospective medical
opinion as to what level of disability evaluation should be assigned
for the earlier date.183 After reviewing the results of the retroactive
medical opinion, the RO evaluated Mr. Beasley’s service-connected
PTSD as 50% disabling since July 1987.184 Mr. Beasley appealed,
arguing that a higher evaluation was appropriate.185
Through his attorney, Mr. Beasley contacted his VA treating
physician and requested a medical opinion that would support his
efforts to demonstrate that his PTSD was at least 70% disabling from
May 1985 and that he should be awarded a total disability evaluation
from January 1992.186 A VA attorney responded by letter, noting
that it was the Agency’s policy to counsel VA treating physicians187
not to provide such letters in order to avoid “a conflict of interest,”
and that the Agency had directed Mr. Beasley’s treating physician
not to reply to the veteran’s request.188 The letter noted that such
requests were to be submitted to the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA) and encouraged Mr. Beasley to “follow the
appropriate appeals procedure[s].”189

179. Id. at 586.
180. 709 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
181. Id. at 1159.
182. Id. at 1155.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1156.
186. Id.
187. VA physicians who provide ongoing medical care and treatment to veterans
are part of the Veterans Health Administration and not part of the VBA. VBA
physicians receive specific training about how to conduct compensation and pension
examinations and how the medical evidence obtained at such examinations informs
the medical opinions they provide for the purposes of benefits adjudication.
188. Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1156.
189. Id.
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Rather than wait for a RO decision and then appeal to the Board
and the Veterans Court, Mr. Beasley petitioned the Veterans Court
for a writ of mandamus ordering VA to direct his treating physician to
provide a letter opining on the severity of his service-connected
PTSD.190 He argued that VA had breached its duty to assist under 38
U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) by refusing to provide him with a medical
opinion.191 The Veterans Court denied the petition and found that
Mr. Beasley had not satisfied the requirements for a writ because he
had failed to show why an appeal would not provide adequate
relief.192 On the merits, the Veterans Court also noted that 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103(d)(1) requires VA to provide a medical opinion when it is
needed to decide a claim but does not entitle a veteran to a medical
opinion by a VA treating physician of the veteran’s own choice.193
Mr. Beasley appealed the denial of his writ.194
In an opinion by Judge Bryson, the Federal Circuit first established
that it had jurisdiction to review the matter, finding that “[the] claim
raise[d] a question regarding the scope of the legal obligation
imposed on [VA] under section 5103A,” regardless of the fact that
the legal question had been presented in the form of a petition for
mandamus.195 The Federal Circuit concluded: “This court has
jurisdiction to review the [Veterans Court]’s decision whether to
grant a mandamus petition that raises a non-frivolous legal
question . . . . We may not review the factual merits of the veteran’s
claim, but we may determine whether the petitioner has satisfied the
legal standard for issuing the writ.”196
On the merits, Judge Bryson noted that “neither section
5103A(a)(1) nor section 5103A(d)(1) imposes an open-ended
obligation on [VA] to provide a medical examination or opinion on
demand,” and that it was not clear whether Mr. Beasley was entitled
to a new medical opinion as a matter of law because even the Board’s
2010 order only required the RO “to ‘consider’ providing [Mr.
Beasley with] a clinical evaluation, a retrospective medical evaluation,
or both.”197 Finally, Judge Bryson noted that if Mr. Beasley’s request
was granted by allowing his petition, it would advance his claim at the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1159.
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cost of delay to other veterans who were using the appeals process as
it was intended.198 The judge concluded:
[W]idespread use of the writ of mandamus as a substitute for the
ordinary appeals process mandated by Congress, at least in cases in
which the veteran claims that the [VA] breached its duty to
assist . . . is not a result that would be beneficial to the system as a
whole, and it is certainly not one contemplated by Congress.199

Judge Newman dissented. She agreed that the Federal Circuit had
jurisdiction to review the matter, but, unlike the majority, focused on
VA’s stated reasons for instructing Mr. Beasley’s treating physician
not to provide a medical opinion.200 She reviewed VA’s attorney’s
letter and expressed disbelief that allowing a VA treating physician to
provide information about a patient who had specifically requested it
could be a conflict of interest: “Is the VA preventing the VA
physician from presenting an opinion that could favor the veteran,
on the theory that such an opinion presents a conflict of interest?
This cannot be correct.”201 She concluded that for VA to “prohibit a
veteran’s VA physician from reviewing the veteran’s evidence of
service connection . . . cannot be what Congress intended by the
‘duty to assist.’”202
This case is another illustration of how easy it is to disagree about
what it means for a system to be “veteran friendly.” The majority
focused on one aspect of the procedure—the use of a writ of
mandamus to advance a veteran’s claim more quickly than the
traditional appeals process—and reasonably concluded that allowing
a veteran to use a writ in this way would be unfair to the many other
veterans who also face long waiting times as their claims are
adjudicated and appealed.203 The dissent focused on a different
aspect of the procedure—VA’s duty to assist the veteran by supplying
a medical opinion that provides competent medical evidence relating
to the claim—and reasonably concluded that, on its face, it seemed
like ludicrous policy for VA to prevent the veteran’s treating
physician, who presumably is most familiar with the severity of his
condition, from providing an opinion on the matter.204

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1159–60 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id. at 1159 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1160 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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3.

Fair process and the procedure for responding to a VA medical opinion
In Sprinkle v. Shinseki,205 the Federal Circuit addressed “whether fair
process requires that the Board allow [a] claimant an additional 60
days to respond to evidence obtained on remand after the claimant
declines to respond to a summary of that evidence in a Supplemental
Statement of the Case”206 (“SSOC”). By statute, the veterans benefits
adjudication system provides for two levels of review of a veteran’s
claim: first at the RO and then at the Board.207 In general, all
evidence related to a claim must be considered by the RO in the first
instance.208 At the Board level, “[i]f further evidence, clarification of
evidence . . . or any other action is essential for a proper appellate
decision,” then the Board must remand the claim to the RO and
specify what action is required.209 If, after such a remand, the RO
denies the benefits sought, it must issue an SSOC addressing the
additional evidence submitted and the claimant must be given thirty
days to respond to the SSOC before the RO returns the matter to
the Board.210 After the appeal is certified to the Board, the claimant
must be given an additional ninety days to submit new evidence to
the RO.211
Although it was not established until 2009 that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to proceedings in which
veterans apply for benefits from VA,212 the Veterans Court created the
fair process doctrine in 1993 based on principles underlying VA
adjudication procedures.213 This doctrine established that, before the
Board may rely on any evidence developed or obtained after the
claimant has received the most recent SOC or SSOC, the Board must
“provide [the] claimant with reasonable notice of such evidence . . .
and a reasonable opportunity for the claimant to respond to it.”214
Later case law clarified that the claimant must be permitted to

205. 733 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
206. Id. at 1184–85.
207. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2012) (Board); id. § 7105(d)(1) (RO or agency). See
generally id. § 7105(b)(1) (outlining the procedural and timeliness requirements for
filing a notice of disagreement and initiating appellate review).
208. Id. § 7104(a).
209. 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (2013).
210. Id. §§ 19.31(a), 19.38.
211. Id. § 20.1304(a).
212. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding
explicitly that entitlement to a disability claim is a property interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment such that an applicant “has a
constitutional right to a fundamentally fair adjudication of his claim”).
213. Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1993).
214. Id. at 126.
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respond not only with argument and comment, but also must be
given the opportunity to provide additional evidence.215
Veteran Jimmy R. Sprinkle applied for service-connected disability
benefits for mitral valve prolapse and myoclonus.216 He received a VA
medical examination, after which the RO denied his claim.217 On
appeal, the Board remanded for an additional medical examination
and that examination took place in October 2009.218 Thereafter, the
RO continued to deny service-connected benefits in an October 21,
2009, SSOC.219 Mr. Sprinkle was notified that he had thirty days to
respond with additional comments or evidence before the matter
would be returned to the Board.220 Instead, two weeks later, he
elected to have his appeal returned directly to the Board without
submitting any additional information.221 Nine days after that, Mr.
Sprinkle was notified that his appeal had been certified to the Board
and that his file was being transferred to that office.222 He was
informed that he had “90 days, or until the Board issued a decision in
his case” to send additional evidence about his appeal to the Board.223
A week later, Mr. Sprinkle, then represented by an attorney, formally
disagreed with the SSOC, requested that the case be transferred to
the Board, and asked that the RO send him a copy of all evidence
obtained after December 2004—including the October 2009 negative
medical linkage opinion.224 Because the file had been transferred to
the Board, this request, which was subsequently twice-repeated, had
to be forwarded from the RO to the Board.225
On May 6, 2010, Mr. Sprinkle’s attorney received copies of Mr.
Sprinkle’s appeals documents from the Board, including the October
2009 negative medical linkage opinion.226 On June 3, 2010, less than
thirty days later, the Board denied the service-connected benefits that
Mr. Sprinkle sought.227
Mr. Sprinkle appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that “the
Board failed to afford him fair process in the adjudication of his
215. Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 547, 551 (1994) (clarifying the fair process
doctrine).
216. Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1180, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1182–83.
222. Id. at 1183.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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claims by not providing him with a copy of the October 7, 2009,
medical examiner’s opinion until fewer than 30 days before the
Board’s decision.”228 The Veterans Court disagreed and affirmed
the Board’s denial of benefits; Mr. Sprinkle then appealed to the
Federal Circuit.229
Judge Reyna, writing for the majority, noted that the fair process
doctrine “is only triggered when ‘evidence [is] developed or obtained
by [the Board] subsequent to the issuance of the most recent [SOC]
or [SSOC] with respect to such claim.”230 He concluded that the case
at hand was distinguishable from Thurber v. Brown231 and other cases
in which the fair process doctrine applied because Mr. Sprinkle did
receive a summary of the new evidence developed by the RO, in the
form of an SSOC that described the October 2009 negative medical
opinion.232 Judge Reyna further found that Mr. Sprinkle himself had
affirmatively declined to respond to the SSOC and had not, at any
point, challenged the adequacy of the summary of evidence in the
SSOC.233 Therefore, the fair process doctrine was not implicated.234
Nor was this a case like Young v. Shinseki,235 in which the veteran did
not receive a copy of the medical opinion until after the Board
decision was issued, because Mr. Sprinkle received the documents he
requested several weeks before the Board’s decision.236 The majority
concluded that “[w]hile it [was] regrettable that there was less than
30 days between when Mr. Sprinkle’s counsel received the medical
exam he subsequently requested and when the Board issued its
decision, Mr. Sprinkle was not prejudiced by any action of the
agency” because it was he who affirmatively chose to have the appeal
immediately returned to the Board, had seven months to submit new
evidence, and never challenged the adequacy of the RO’s summary of
the medical examination during that time.237 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s conclusion that Mr.
Sprinkle was not denied fair process.238
Judge Taranto dissented and opined that the case should be
remanded because “[t]he Veterans Court’s discussion leaves
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Vet. App. 119 (1993).
Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1186.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186.
22 Vet. App. 461 (2009).
Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1186.
Id. at 1186–87.
Id. at 1187.
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uncertain how it interpreted the doctrine” and “[o]n this ‘rule of law’
issue, it is advisable for the Veterans Court to provide clarification in
the first instance.”239 He called the analysis by the Veterans Court
“troublingly incomplete about its understanding of the ‘fair process’
doctrine”240 and noted that such an analysis would not generally be
considered sufficient in a more mainstream legal context:
[T]he Veterans Court did not discuss the obvious issues raised . . . .
In our legal system, where a tribunal relies on evidence in a way
that is adverse to a party, it is virtually never sufficient to have told
the party in advance that the evidence exists, or even to have
provided a description of it; the party is broadly entitled, upon
request, to scrutinize the evidence directly and not be forced to
rely on the accuracy or completeness of another’s description of it.
This principle is fundamental to notions of fair process even in the
constitutional context.241

Judge Taranto then tied these concepts back to the specific context
of veterans law, noting that the nature of the veterans benefits system
means that such general notions of fair process should be even more
applicable in this area, rather than less:
It is hard to see how it could not be fundamental in a claimantfriendly adjudicatory system like the one established for veterans’
benefits. Perhaps in some settings an argument might be made for
withholding evidence from a party even if the tribunal relies on it.
This case involves no such argument:
the government
acknowledges that Mr. Sprinkle was entitled to be given the
evidence upon request.242

Judge Taranto’s dissent focused on the veteran’s right to receive the
evidence and VA’s duty to provide it, but did not address the veteran’s
actions in affirmatively requesting that his appeal be certified to the
Board while stating that he had no further evidence or argument to
submit.243 The judge’s concern about the “troublingly incomplete”
analysis in the Veterans Court decision, as compared to other areas of
federal law, seems to overlook the fact that the majority of Veterans
Court decisions are single-judge adjudications and non-precedential.244

239. Id. (Taranto, J., dissenting) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (2012)).
240. Id. at 1188.
241. Id. at 1189 (citations omitted).
242. Id.
243. Id. (Taranto, J., dissenting); see also Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193
(1991) (noting that the “duty to assist is not a one-way street”).
244. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2012AnnualReport.pdf (showing that,
in 2012, the vast majority of appeals came before a single judge, as opposed to a
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The Veterans Court traditionally has one of the highest appeal rates in
the entire federal judiciary; it is only by using its statutory ability to
issue such non-precedential decisions that the court is able to manage
such an overwhelming workload.245 As a result, its single-judge, nonprecedential decisions are often concise and do not exhaustively explain
every aspect of the law they address because such decisions affect only
one individual claimant and do not establish precedential law.246
4. “Combined effects” medical examination for total disability evaluation
based on individual unemployability
In Geib v. Shinseki,247 the Federal Circuit considered whether a
veteran with multiple service-connected conditions who applies for a
total disability evaluation based on individual unemployability
(“TDIU”) is entitled to a “comprehensive” or “combined effects”
medical examination to consider all service-connected disabilities
together, or whether VA’s duty to assist is met by providing a separate
medical examination for each condition.248 If a veteran is “unable to
secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of
service-connected disabilities,” then VA must assign TDIU.249 The
Veterans Court has clarified that “a request for TDIU, whether
expressly raised by a veteran or reasonably raised by the record, is not
a separate claim for benefits, but rather involves an attempt to obtain
an appropriate [evaluation] for a disability or disabilities, . . .
[including] as part of a claim for increased compensation.”250

multi-judge panel or the full Veterans Court); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (“The
Court may hear cases by judges sitting alone or in panels . . . .”).
245. See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 244, at 5 (finding the average of 244
appeals decided per active Veterans Court judge to be “the second highest number
of merits decisions per active judge” amongst the twelve circuit courts of appeals).
246. Ridgway, supra note 41, at 154 (“[T]he court’s panel decisions serve its role as
a law giver while the single-judge decisions correct errors.”). In addition, the veteran
waiting for a decision from the Veterans Court has often been stuck on what has
been called the “hamster wheel” of VA’s adjudication system for years, if not decades,
before his or her appeal even reaches the Veterans Court. Michael Serota &
Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. REV. 388, 390–91 (2011).
Most of the claims are for disability compensation, and many of the claimants served
in either World War II or the Korean or Vietnam conflicts, which means that the
average claimant at the Veterans Court is both disabled and possibly elderly, or the
surviving spouse of such a veteran. Id.
247. 733 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
248. See id. at 1352–53 (“Geib applied for total disability based on individual
unemployability,” and, on appeal, he argued “that the Board was required to obtain a
single medical opinion that addressed the impact of all his service-connected
disabilities on employability.”).
249. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2013).
250. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447, 453–54 (2009) (per curiam); see also
Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a claim for
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Edward W. Geib, a World War II veteran, applied for TDIU on the
basis that his service-connected trenchfoot,251 bilateral hearing loss,
and tinnitus made him unable to obtain or retain gainful
employment.252 At the time, his combined disability evaluation was
70%.253 The RO denied TDIU but the Board remanded the matter
“with orders to provide Mr. Geib with medical examinations and to
re-adjudicate his TDIU claim.”254 After an examination to assess Mr.
Geib’s service-connected bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus, an
audiologist opined that these conditions did not prevent Mr. Geib
from “seeking or maintaining gainful physical or sedentary
employment . . . in a loosely-supervised situation, requiring minimal
interaction with the public.”255 After a second examination to assess
the service-connected trenchfoot, the medical examiner noted that
“Mr. Geib’s employment would certainly be affected by his trenchfoot,
and . . . he could not do a mildly or moderately physical job that would
include standing or walking for long periods of time.”256 However, the
examiner concluded that “Mr. Geib should be able to obtain and
maintain gainful employment at a sedentary job.”257
After considering these two medical opinions, the VA RO increased
the disability evaluation for Mr. Geib’s hearing loss and tinnitus from
50% to 80%, which brought his combined disability evaluation to
90%.258 However, the RO continued to deny a TDIU evaluation.259 On
appeal, the Board agreed that Mr. Geib was not entitled to a TDIU,
finding that although his service-connected disabilities “do affect his
employability,” they “do not prevent him from being employed.”260
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Geib argued “that the Board
was required to obtain a single medical opinion that addressed the
impact of all his service-connected disabilities on employability.”261

increased disability evaluation coupled with evidence of unemployability raises claim
for TDIU).
251. “Trenchfoot” is “a type of immersion foot resembling frostbite, caused by
prolonged action of cold water on the skin combined with circulatory disturbance
due to cold and inaction.” DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 728 (32d
ed. 2011).
252. Geib, 733 F.3d at 1351–52.
253. Id. at 1352.
254. Id.
255. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id.
257. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id. at 1352–53.
259. Id. at 1353.
260. Id. (citation omitted).
261. Id. (citation omitted).
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The Veterans Court rejected this argument262 and concluded that the
Board itself properly considered the combined effects of the two
separate medical opinions when it concluded that Mr. Geib was
capable of sedentary employment in the type of situation described
by the audiologist.263
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Geib argued that when a
veteran is service-connected for multiple disabilities, VA’s duty to
assist implicitly “requires a single medical opinion addressing the
aggregate effect of all disabilities on employability.”264 He argued
that, “when a medical opinion does not address all these factors, the
VA may not fill in the gaps by providing its own ‘expert’ opinion
regarding the combined effect of the veteran’s disabilities.”265
The Federal Circuit did not find these arguments persuasive. It
agreed with the Veterans Court and stated: “Where, as here,
separate medical opinions address the impact on employability
resulting from independent disabilities, the VA is authorized to
assess the aggregate effect of all disabilities, as it did.”266 However,
the court established no categorical rule about when a combinedeffects opinion would be necessary.267
Within days after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Geib, the
Veterans Court issued a precedential decision in Floore v. Shinseki268
on virtually the same issue.269 Although the Veterans Court majority,
like the Federal Circuit in Geib, concluded that a combined-effects
medical examination or opinion was not required by statute or
regulation,270 the concurrence raised several key issues that were not
262. Geib v. Shinseki, No. 11-1501, 2012 WL 2050416, at *3 (Vet. App. June 7,
2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 1350.
263. Id. at *3–4; see id. at *3 (finding that the Board complied with the Veterans
Court precedent “that the Board must interpret all evidence of record, medical or
otherwise, and then assess the combined effect of the veteran’s service-connected
disabilities on his or her ability to engage in substantially gainful employment”).
264. Geib, 733 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 1354 (citation omitted).
266. Id.
267. Cf. Floore v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 376, 384 (2013) (Bartley, J., concurring)
(stating, in a decision decided after Geib, that there should be an expert opinion on
the overall functional impairment for TDIU entitlement when there are multiple
compensable service-connected disabilities that affect different body systems).
268. 26 Vet. App. 376 (2013).
269. Id. at 377 (“Floore appeals . . . [the] decision of the Board of Veteran’s
Appeals . . . that denied entitlement to a [TDIU] due to multiple service-connected
disabilities [arguing] that for a claimant with multiple service-connected disabilities,
a medical opinion addressing the combined effects of all service-connected
disabilities is required for the Board to render a decision on entitlement to
TDIU . . . .”).
270. See id. at 381 (“There is no statute or regulation which requires the
Secretary . . . to use experts to resolve the issue of unemployability.” (quoting Gary v.
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 229, 231–32 (1994))). Floore relied on, inter alia, VA Fast Letter
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addressed in the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion.271
The
concurrence noted that when a medical examiner provides an
opinion about whether a veteran is unemployable as a result of
service-connected disabilities, the examiner must furnish a full
description of the effects of the disability upon the veteran’s ordinary
activities, including work.272 The opinion observed that, in this case,
Mr. Floore had service-connected disabilities that were evaluated as
90% disabling and that the seven disabilities affected four different
body systems.273 Under such circumstances, even if there was no
bright-line rule requiring a combined-effects opinion in every case,
the concurrence opined that, “as a practical matter where there are
multiple compensable service-connected disabilities, especially
affecting different body systems, expert opinion on the overall
functional impairment, including occupational impairment, caused
by the combination of service-connected disabilities will be necessary for
an adequately reasoned decision as to TDIU entitlement.”274 By focusing on
the need for adequate reasoning, the Geib concurrence may have left
the door open for veterans to argue that their situation warrants a
combined-effects medical opinion, even if such an opinion is not
required in every case.
D. Service Connection
At least initially, most disability compensation claims turn on
whether a veteran can establish that his or her current disability can
be linked to military service.275 There are numerous ways that service
connection may be proven. Establishing “direct” service connection
generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence
of (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of
a disease or injury; and (3) a link between the claimed in-service
13-13 for his assertion that VA is required to administer a combined-effects medical
examination whenever a veteran files a TDIU claim. Id. at 380–81. Ironically,
however, the Fast Letter “specifically state[d] that VA is not required to provide a
general medical examination in connection with every TDIU claim.” Id. at 381
(internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Id. at 384–85 (Bartley, J., concurring).
272. Floore, 26 Vet. App. at 384 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.10 (2013)).
273. Id. at 385.
274. Id. at 384 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.10).
275. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2012) (“The term ‘compensation’ means a monthly
payment made by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] to a veteran because of serviceconnected disability, or to a surviving spouse, child, or parent of a veteran because of
the service-connected death of the veteran . . . .”); id. § 101(16) (defining “serviceconnected” as meaning that “such disability was incurred or aggravated” in service);
see also id. § 1110 (2012) (defining wartime disability compensation, in part, as
payment “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease
contracted in line of duty”).
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disease or injury and the present disability.276 “Secondary” service
connection is awarded when a disability “is proximately due to or
the result of a service-connected disease or injury.”277 “Additional
disability resulting from the aggravation of a non-serviceconnected condition by a service-connected condition is also
compensable under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a).”278 There are also
regulations that create exceptions to the evidentiary hurdles for
specific groups of veterans.279
1.

Establishing service connection by continuity of symptomatology
Early in 2013, the Federal Circuit substantially limited one of the
long-standing routes by which veterans were previously able to
establish that their disabilities were linked to service: showing
symptoms of a disability continuously since service.280 Also, later in
the year, the Federal Circuit clarified that lay testimony is sufficient to
establish the existence of observable symptoms and can be adequate,
by itself, to establish service connection.281
In Walker v. Shinseki,282 the Federal Circuit substantially limited the
“theory of continuity of symptomatology” when it held that this
method of establishing service connection only applied to the
chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a).283 The first applicable

276. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999) (citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 498, 506 (1995)); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“In the case of any veteran who engaged in combat with the enemy in active
service with [the U.S.] military . . . , the Secretary shall accept as sufficient proof of
service-connection of any disease or injury alleged to have been incurred in or
aggravated by such service satisfactory lay or other evidence of service incurrence or
aggravation of such injury or disease . . . .” (emphasis omitted ) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (“Service connection connotes many factors
but basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular
injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service in the
Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein.”).
277. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a).
278. Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 522 (1996).
279. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a)–(c) (identifying certain diseases and other
conditions that, if certain requirements are satisfied, are presumed to be serviceconnected for those who contracted enumerated chronic or tropical diseases or were
prisoners of war).
280. See, e.g., Hickson, 12 Vet. App. at 253 (holding that 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) allows
veterans to show entitlement to disability compensation when they do not suffer
from a chronic disease enumerated in § 3.309(a) if they can show continuity of
symptomatology through medical evidence or lay testimony).
281. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (identifying
three standards for when “[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to
establish a diagnosis of a condition” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Buchanan
v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that lay evidence must be
considered and can be sufficient in and of itself).
282. 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
283. Id. at 1338.
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regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), sets forth basic principles relating to
service connection, including that it may be established “by
affirmatively showing inception or aggravation during service or
through the application of statutory presumptions.”284 The subsection that follows immediately thereafter sets forth two additional
ways to establish service connection: chronicity and continuity. The
first section states that “[w]ith chronic disease shown as such in service
(or within the presumptive period under [38 C.F.R] § 3.307) so as to
permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of
the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service
connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes.”285 Later
text in the same sub-section clarifies that “where the condition noted
during service (or in the presumptive period) is not, in fact, shown to
be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately
questioned,” then an evidentiary showing of continuity of symptoms
since service is required.286
Veteran Julius E. Walker submitted a claim for disability
compensation for bilateral hearing loss that was denied by the RO
and the Board on the basis of a VA audiologist’s opinion finding no
linkage to service and attributing the veteran’s hearing loss to age
and noise from recreational hunting.287 The veteran died during the
pendency of his appeal to the Veterans Court, and his son (Mr.
Walker) was substituted as a potential accrued benefits claimant.288
Before the Veterans Court, Mr. Walker argued that the linkage
opinion was inadequate because the audiologist did not review lay
statements from the veteran’s family indicating that the veteran
suffered from “continuous long-standing symptomatology.”289 He
also argued that the Board failed to consider the same lay
284. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a).
285. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). The sub-section continues:
This rule does not mean that any manifestation of joint pain, any
abnormality of heart action or heart sounds, any urinary findings of casts, or
any cough, in service will permit service connection of arthritis, disease of
the heart, nephritis, or pulmonary disease, first shown as a clear-cut clinical
entity, at some later date. For the showing of chronic disease in service there
is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease
entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as
distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the
word “Chronic.”
When the disease identity is established (leprosy,
tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, etc.), there is no requirement of evidentiary
showing of continuity.
Id.
286. Id.
287. Walker, 708 F.3d at 1332–33.
288. Id. at 1332.
289. Id. at 1333–34.
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statements.290 The Veterans Court conducted a standard three-part
analysis for service connection and concluded that the Board had not
committed any clear error when it weighed the lay evidence against
the opinion of the VA audiologist.291 The court did not consider
whether service connection could be established under a theory of
continuity of symptomatology and affirmed the Board’s denial.292
Mr. Walker appealed to the Federal Circuit.293 In an opinion by
Judge Clevenger, the court noted that the lack of a cross-reference to
38 C.F.R § 3.309(a) in § 3.303(b) created ambiguity as to whether
§ 3.309(a)’s list of chronic conditions limited the application of
§ 3.303(b)’s path to service connection under a theory of continuity
of symptomatology.294 The Secretary argued that “diseases that would
be considered ‘chronic’ in a medical sense, but which are not listed
in § 3.309(a), could qualify for service connection only under the
three-element test under § 3.303(a)”295 as explained in early Veterans
Court cases.296 However, such diseases would not qualify for service
connection under a theory of continuity of symptomatology unless
they were explicitly listed in 38 C.F.R § 3.309(a).297 Judge Clevenger
determined that the Agency’s position was “reasonable” and rejected
Mr. Walker’s broader assertion that continuity of symptomatology
could establish service connection even for diseases or injuries that
are not chronic.298
2. Establishing stressor requirement for PTSD based on military sexual
trauma
a.

Probative value of negative evidence

In two consolidated cases with similar facts, the Federal Circuit
addressed military sexual trauma (“MST”)—an issue frequently in the

290. Id. at 1334.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1332.
294. Id. at 1338.
295. Id.
296. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999) (enumerating the three ways to
show service connection for VA disability compensation: (1) showing “medical
evidence of a current disability”; (2) providing “medical or, in certain circumstances,
lay evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service”; and (3)
introducing “medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service injury or
disease and the current disability.”); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995)
(describing how claimants can show service connection through medical or lay
evidence to connect current disabilities with activities while in the military).
297. Walker, 708 F.3d at 1337.
298. Id. at 1338–40.
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news in 2013.299 The court held that neither the absence of service
records documenting a sexual assault during military service nor a
veteran’s failure to report an in-service sexual assault at the time of
occurrence could be considered as pertinent evidence that a sexual
assault did not occur.300
Establishing service connection for PTSD is similar to establishing
service connection for any disability but also requires that the veteran
provide evidence that he or she experienced an “in-service stressor”
and establish, by medical evidence, a causal link between the
veteran’s current symptoms and the stressor.301 The existence of the
in-service stressor may, in some situations, be proven by lay
evidence.302 However, recognizing that victims of in-service assaults,
particularly sexual assaults, face additional difficulties in
corroborating their assault as a stressor, VA has promulgated specific
regulations to address this evidentiary problem. When a PTSD claim
is based on “in-service personal assault,” which includes sexual
assault, the regulation provides that
evidence from sources other than the veteran’s service records may
corroborate the veteran’s account of the stressor incident.
Examples of such evidence include, but are not limited to: records
from law enforcement authorities, rape crisis centers, mental
health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians; pregnancy tests
or tests for sexually transmitted diseases; and statements from
family members, roommates, fellow service members, or clergy.303

Supporting evidence found in such sources, if credible and pertinent,
is positive evidence of the in-service stressor and VA is required to
consider such evidence.304
Veterans AZ and AY sought disability compensation for PTSD
based on sexual assaults they stated happened during their military
service.305 In both cases, the veterans’ service records had no

299. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Reports of Military Sexual Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-of-military
-sexual-assault-rise-sharply.html?_r=0 (discussing the increase of sexual assaults in the
military over the 2013 fiscal year).
300. AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
301. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2013) (establishing that service connection for PTSD
requires (1) a medical diagnosis of PTSD; (2) “a link, established by medical
evidence, between [the] current symptoms and an in-service stressor”; and (3)
“credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred”).
302. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 330
F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding the validity of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)
because it does not prohibit consideration of lay evidence).
303. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5).
304. Id.
305. AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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indication they had been treated for, or that they had reported, a
sexual assault during service.306
AZ claimed that her PTSD was the result of sexual and physical
abuse by a higher-ranking, non-commissioned officer.307 Her three
siblings submitted affidavits that she told them about the abuse in
the spring of 1974 and that AZ was afraid to report the assaults to
military authorities who she did not think would believe her.308 AZ
herself stated that “she did not report these incidents to the military
legal authorities because she was a young girl, sexually assaulted,
verbally abused and beaten by a superior [officer] and she was in
fear of her life.”309
The claim was denied by the RO and, eventually, by the Board—in
part because service records did not include reports of the alleged
assaults and in part because the assaults were never reported to
military authorities.310 “The Board stated that under the applicable
regulations, [s]ervice department records must support and not
contradict, the veteran’s testimony regarding non-combat stressors.”311
The Board discounted the probative value of the three lay affidavits
from AZ’s siblings on the basis that they had not witnessed the
assaults taking place.312
AY claimed that her PTSD was the result of a sexual assault by
another soldier during military training.313 Her service records did
not report treatment for any assault and AY confirmed that she did
not report the incident to military authorities when it occurred.314
However, she did submit a statement from her husband, who stated
that AY told him about the assault when they were in service
together.315 She later submitted three more lay statements from
people who knew her during service.316 A fellow soldier stationed
with AY during training reported that AY told her about the assault
the day after it happened; AY’s roommate at her next duty
assignment reported that AY attempted suicide and received

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 1305, 1307.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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treatment at the base hospital; and AY’s sister stated that AY’s
personality completely changed after her time in the military.317
The RO denied the claim,318 finding that although “AY had
‘provided statements from [four individuals] who support that they
knew [her] while in service and that [she] told them about the rape,”
the statements were insufficient because the affiants did not witness
the incident.319 On appeal, the Board “also acknowledged the [four]
lay statements, but found that they were directly contradicted by
other evidence” because AY had not reported the assault at the time
nor received any psychiatric treatment.320
The Veterans Court affirmed both decisions in a single-judge
memorandum.321 It concluded that the Board’s weighing of the
evidence was permissible and that the Board had provided adequate
reasons or bases for finding the veterans’ statements not credible.322
In an opinion authored by Judge Dyk, the Federal Circuit vacated
and remanded both cases.323 The majority engaged in a very lengthy
analysis that began by noting that VA is obligated to consider all
evidence that is “‘pertinent’ to service connection.”324 It referred to
the rules established in Buchanan v. Nicholson325 that the lack of
contemporaneous medical records “does not, in and of itself,
render lay evidence not credible,” although “‘the lack of [such]
records may be a fact that the Board can consider and weigh against
a veteran’s lay evidence.’”326
Regarding the first issue—whether the absence of a service record
documenting an unreported sexual assault is pertinent evidence that
the sexual assault did not occur—the majority noted that the
appellants were arguing that the absence of such service records is
not pertinent evidence because it is unreasonable to expect that such
records would exist.327 Judge Dyk’s majority decision stated that “VA
does not dispute that, in the great majority of cases, such incidents
are not reported to military authorities, and therefore such records
do not exist.”328 The decision also acknowledged that “[s]ervicemen

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309.
AY v. Shinseki, No. 10-2390, 2011 WL 5966264, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 17, 2011).
AZ, 731 F.3d at 1309.
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1311 (citing Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
AZ, 731 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336).
Id.
Id. at 1312.
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and servicewomen who experience inservice sexual assaults face
‘unique’ disincentives to report.”329 To support this conclusion, the
majority decision referred to the victims’ “fear of retaliation or
reprisals,”330 fear of punishment for any other misconduct that may
have been occurring at the time of the assault, the stigma that may be
associated with reporting a sexual assault, and fear that reporting
such an assault may make the victims appear weak or incapable of
performing their job.331
The majority reviewed the common law evidentiary rule that the
absence of evidence is only admissible as negative evidence if the
event in question is of the type that would normally be
documented.332 The court explained that “[t]he absence of a record
of an event which would ordinarily be recorded gives rise to a legitimate
negative inference that the event did not occur”333 and,
“[c]orrespondingly, courts have refused to admit evidence of the
absence of a record to show that an event did not occur, where it was
not reasonable to expect the event to have been recorded.”334 After
reviewing the development of common law evidentiary rules, as
followed by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts and codified
by the FRE, the majority decided not to admit “unreliable record
evidence.335
The majority concluded that “basic evidentiary
principles preclude treating the absence of a record of an unreported
sexual assault as evidence of the nonoccurrence of the assault.”336 On
the first issue before it, the Federal Circuit held: “[W]here an alleged
[in-service] sexual assault . . . is not reported, the absence of service
records documenting the alleged assault is not pertinent evidence
that the assault did not occur.”337
Regarding the second issue—whether a veteran’s failure to report an
in-service sexual assault to military authorities constitutes pertinent
evidence that such an assault did not occur—the court held that “VA
may not treat a claimant’s failure to report an alleged sexual assault to
military authorities as pertinent evidence that the sexual assault did not
occur.”338 As with the first issue, the decision looked beyond the
confines of veterans law for its rationale. The majority’s opinion
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 1313.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1315 (citation omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. at 1322.
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started by noting the historic belief that “in the context of criminal
rape trials, . . . it [wa]s so natural as to be almost inevitable that a rape
victim would ‘make immediate complaint [about the rape] to her
mother or other confidential friend.’”339 Therefore, under this historic
presumption, “it was thought that a victim’s failure to promptly report
the rape to anyone was a ‘suspicious inconsistency.’”340
The majority concluded that this “common law theory of
pertinence” was inapposite for five reasons. First, it noted that even
when it was applicable, the historic presumption was only appropriate
if a victim had failed to report a rape to anyone at all, and it did not
apply when the victim reported a rape to family or friends.341 Second,
the decision reviewed legislative reports and recent case law from
numerous jurisdictions and concluded that “modern courts are
skeptical that the lack of a prompt report has probative value” and
that “[i]t is now known that sexual assault is generally
underreported.”342 The court also noted that, unlike criminal cases
in which defendants have a right to cross-examine a witness about
potential omissions, “[i]n the context of a non-adversarial civil
benefits proceeding, such as a VA benefits proceeding, there is no
criminal defendant, and these constitutional concerns are
inapposite.”343 Third, the court noted that both civil and criminal
courts have held that testimony about the failure to make a report is
inadmissible when “there is reason to suspect that no report or other
statement would have been made.”344 Fourth, the court observed that
reporting an in-service sexual assault carries a “unique deterrent” in
the form of immediate reprisals from superior officers who almost
certainly know the alleged perpetrator personally—an uncommon
phenomenon in criminal cases.345 Finally, the majority reasoned that
“the veteran’s benefits system is based on ‘solicitude for the
claimant,’”346 and, given that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs had
determined, based on empirical evidence, that many in-service sexual
assaults will not be reported to authorities, it would “hardly comport
with [such] a [pro-claimant] system” to create a penalty against
service members who failed to report an in-service assault.347
339. Id. at 1318–19 (quoting Baccio v. New York, 41 N.Y. 265, 268 (1869)).
340. Id. at 1319 (citation omitted).
341. Id. at 1319.
342. Id. at 1319–20 (citation omitted).
343. Id. at 1320.
344. Id. at 1320 (comparing this principle to the rule on omissions from
unreliable records).
345. Id. at 1322.
346. Id. (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985)).
347. Id.
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Accordingly, the court remanded the cases and held that the
approach taken by the Board and ratified by the Veterans Court was
“unsupported by the applicable statute and regulations, contradicted
by the empirical evidence, and contrary to general evidence law.”348
Judge Moore dissented, objecting to the majority’s decision on
several grounds. First, she observed that, while the veterans in these
two cases were certainly sympathetic claimants, this did not change
the fact that “our jurisdiction prevents us from reviewing fact findings
or even applications of law to fact.”349 She suggested that the majority
actually disagreed with the Board’s weighing of the evidence in these
two cases and that, “as such, [it] was forced to adopt this new,
categorical rule of law.”350
Judge Moore also objected to the majority’s reliance on extrarecord information, observing that “none of the studies cited by the
majority were a part of the record below, and the VA was not given an
opportunity to explain their import to the cases before us.”351 Her
main objection to the substance of the majority’s analysis was that it
prevented any probative value from being assigned to a failure to
report an in-service sexual assault, rather than allowing the Agency’s
fact finder to consider what weight would be appropriate—the
correct adjudication avenue as established by previous Federal Circuit
case law.352 Judge Moore stated, in reference to Buchanan v.
Nicholson,353 that “[w]e cannot ignore this binding precedent.”354
Before citing Buchanan, however, Judge Moore, like the majority,
reviewed case law from other jurisdictions and general evidentiary
principles and then concluded that the majority’s “new, categorical
rule of law . . . is at odds with other courts, which have consistently
found that non-reporting of sexual assault is relevant.”355
Judge Moore admitted that “as a judge, a woman, and a human
being, I am dubious about the weighing of the evidence and the fact
findings of the VA in this case. But the applicable statutes and basic
principles of evidence law leave us without power to help them.”356
She concluded that “[t]oday, the majority usurps Congress’s role with
its broad proclamation on the admissibility of certain evidence in the

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at 1323.
Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1324–26.
451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
AZ, 731 F.3d at 1326 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1326.
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VA system” and that “[s]olicitude for veterans does not justify making
up rules as we go along.”357
As noted by the dissent, this decision relied on a great deal of
material that was not part of the record before the Agency, with
much of the material drawn from general legal principles as opposed
to being specific to veterans law.358 In its analysis, the majority
referred to the regulatory history of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5), which
was “enacted in part to address the fact that ‘[m]any incidents of inservice personal assault are not officially reported’”359 and noted that
this applies even more so to incidents of in-service personal assaults
that are sexual in nature.360 The majority reviewed annual reports
documenting the number of in-service sexual assaults that are
officially reported to the Department of Defense (DOD) and that are
required to be submitted to Congress.361 The number of in-service
sexual assaults that are reported is very low—only 11% in 2012, 14%
in 2010, and 7% in 2006—as compared to the DOD’s estimated
number of how many assaults actually occurred.362 Thus, in the
majority opinion, the veteran-specific context of unique disincentives
faced by service members who experience an in-service sexual assault
was not the starting point of the analysis. Instead, it appeared at the
end of an extensive discussion of general evidentiary principles and
supporting data from social science research to support the rule that
the majority decision had already reached.363
b. Evidentiary exceptions for PTSD as a result of fear of hostile or
terrorist activity
In Hall v. Shinseki,364 the Federal Circuit reviewed the applicability
of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3), which creates an evidentiary exception for
veterans who claim that they have PTSD as a result of “fear of hostile
military or terrorist activity.”365 The court determined that this
section did not apply to claims of PTSD based on an alleged assault
357. Id.
358. See id. at 1324 (asserting that the majority’s decision was based almost entirely
on studies and common law that were not part of the record below and that, as the
appellate court, the Federal Circuit does not have the authority to act as fact finder
and make decisions based on facts that were not before the lower court).
359. Id. at 1312 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting PostTraumatic Stress Disorder Claims Based on Personal Assault, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,132,
61,132 (proposed Oct. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3)).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 1312–15 (discussing the disincentives to report).
364. 717 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
365. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) (2013).
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by a fellow service member.366 Section 3.304(f)(3) provides that a
veteran’s lay testimony alone may prove that an in-service stressor
occurred if the stressor “is related to the veteran’s fear of hostile
military or terrorist activity.”367 The regulation specifies:
For the purposes of this paragraph, “fear of hostile military or
terrorist activity” means that a veteran experienced, witnessed, or
was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual
or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical
integrity of the veteran or others, such as from an actual or
potential improvised explosive device; vehicle-imbedded explosive
device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small
arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly
military aircraft, and the veteran’s response to the event or
circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state
of fear, helplessness, or horror.368

Veteran Tony Hall served in the U.S. Army in 1990, during which
time he “refused to go to basic training, . . . asked to go home, . . .
threatened to hurt either himself or someone else, demonstrated a
phobia of people in general, and admitted to receiving one year’s
probation after an arrest for carrying a gun.”369 After a psychiatric
evaluation suggested that he might suffer from an “avoidant
personality disorder,” the veteran was officially discharged fifteen
days after he entered military service.370
In 2006, the veteran submitted a claim for disability compensation
for PTSD, based on an alleged in-service sexual assault by a superior
officer.371 The RO denied the claim, in part because the veteran had
“failed to demonstrate a verifiable military stressor.”372 The Board
agreed with the RO and affirmed the denial.373 The Board explained
that, as a matter of law, the veteran could not rely solely on his own
lay statements to establish his in-service stressor because 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f)(3) did not apply to sexual assault as an in-service

366. Hall, 717 F.3d at 1371.
367. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). The regulation also requires that a
psychiatrist or psychologist . . . confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate
to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the veteran’s
symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is
consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.
Id.
368. Id.
369. Hall, 717 F.3d at 1370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1370–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
373. Id. at 1371.
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stressor.374 On the facts, the Board also found that the veteran’s
statements were not credible for multiple reasons.375 On appeal, the
Veterans Court rejected the veteran’s argument and concluded that
§ 3.304(f)(3) did not apply to the type of stressor he alleged.376
Mr. Hall appealed to the Federal Circuit, continuing to argue that
§ 3.304(f)(3) could be applied to PTSD based on an in-service sexual
assault and that this argument was not precluded by the existence of
§ 3.304(f)(5), which specifically provides evidentiary exceptions to
veterans whose PTSD claims are based on in-service personal assaults,
including sexual assaults.377 In a decision authored by Judge Prost,
the court examined the plain language of the regulation, which
refers to a “fear of hostile military or terrorist activity.”378 It
concluded that the examples listed in § 3.304(f)(3) contextualized
the word “hostile” and clarified that the stressor must be the result of
terrorist activity or hostile military activity by an enemy, not a fellow
service member.379 The court also concluded that this reading was
consistent with the rest of § 3.304(f), which provides evidentiary
exceptions to veterans in other types of situations.380 Finally, the
court noted that during the notice and comment period for this
regulation, VA had specifically rejected public comments suggesting
that subsection (f)(3) should cover in-service sexual assaults because
those acts were outside the scope of the specified subsection.381
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the opinion of the
Veterans Court.382
E. Disability Compensation for Injuries Caused by VA
In 2013, the Federal Circuit revisited the law that applies when an
injury may have been caused by VA hospital care or medical
treatment. Generally, under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, VA will pay disability

374. Id.
375. Id. The Board noted that the veteran had never mentioned a sexual assault
when he initially filed his claim, that he was diagnosed with psychotic symptoms
including paranoid delusions, that one of his statements placed the in-service sexual
assault as occurring four days after he was discharged from the military, that he had
twice claimed to have served in the military for three years, that he falsely claimed to
have engaged in combat during his military service, and that the few medical reports
that suggested a linkage between the veteran’s PTSD and his military service were
based on the veteran’s own unreliable oral history. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1373 n.5.
378. Id. at 1372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1373.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1373–74.
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compensation as if a veteran had a service connected injury when the
veteran suffers a “qualifying additional disability” that was not the
result of wilful misconduct and was caused by VA medical or surgical
treatment or hospital care.383 The statute also specifies that the
proximate cause of the injury must be “carelessness, negligence, lack
of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of fault” by VA,
or “an event not reasonably foreseeable.”384
In Viegas v. Shinseki,385 the Federal Circuit addressed whether an
injury incurred at a VA facility, but not directly caused by VA medical
treatment or by VA personnel, should be eligible for disability
benefits under § 1151.386 Veteran John L. Viegas suffered from
incomplete quadriplegia as a result of a diving accident that was not
related to his military service.387 He was receiving aquatic therapy at a
VA medical center.388 After a therapy session, he was using a
restroom in a VA facility when a grab bar he was using to support
himself separated from the wall.389 Mr. Viegas fell and suffered
additional injuries, after which his quadriplegia worsened and he was
no longer able to walk with a walker.390
Mr. Viegas submitted a claim for benefits under § 1151, claiming
that his additional injury was caused by his fall in the VA restroom.391
A VA RO denied the claim, asserting that the veteran was “not in
direct VA care at the time of [his] fall.”392 The Board affirmed the
denial, explaining that § 1151 benefits were only available when an
additional disability [is] the result of injury that was part of the
natural sequence of cause and effect flowing directly from the
actual provision of hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or
examination furnished by [the] VA and . . . such additional
disability was directly caused by that VA activity.393

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board decision, concluding that the
additional disability caused by Mr. Viegas’s fall at a VA facility was
“simply not covered by section 1151” because it was not caused
directly by medical care provided by VA.394
383. 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); see also Roberson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 809, 813 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (detailing the statute’s requirements).
384. 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A)–(B).
385. 705 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
386. Id. at 1378.
387. Id. at 1376.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. (alteration in original).
393. Id. (alterations in original).
394. Id. at 1376–77.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that § 1151 included two
causation elements: (1) that a veteran’s disability must be “caused
by” VA hospital care or medical treatment, and (2) also must be
“proximate[ly] cause[d]” by VA’s fault or an unforeseen event.395
The court noted that “[t]he sole issue presented on appeal [wa]s
whether [the] injury was ‘caused by’ the medical treatment or
hospital care [Viegas] received from . . . VA.”396 The parties offered
widely differing interpretations of the phrase “caused by.”397 The
Secretary argued that the statute required an injury be “‘directly’
caused by the ‘actual’ medical care provided by VA personnel.”398
Mr. Viegas, on the other hand, asserted that even injuries caused by
“remote consequences” of VA medical care were covered by § 1151
and that benefits were available to any veteran who suffered any
injury while at a VA medical facility.399
The Federal Circuit found neither interpretation wholly
compelling. It examined the statutory text and noted the disjunctive
structure stating that an additional disability must be caused by care
“‘either by a [VA] employee or in a [VA] facility.’”400 The court
concluded, therefore, that “Congress intended to encompass not
simply the actual care provided by VA medical personnel, but also
treatment-related incidents that occur in the physical premises
controlled and maintained by . . . VA.”401 In the case at hand, Mr.
Viegas was injured “because the VA failed to properly install and
maintain the equipment necessary to provide him with medical
treatment.”402 The court concluded that providing handicappedaccessible restrooms is an essential part of the health care service that
VA provides to veterans.403 Finally, the court noted that there was
nothing in the plain language of § 1151 requiring that an injury be
“directly” caused by medical care provided by VA staff and that even if
it were a “close case,” Brown v. Gardner404 would require interpreting
the statute in the veteran’s favor.405

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 1377–78.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
513 U.S. 115 (1994).
Viegas, 705 F.3d at 1380.
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The court also examined its holding in Jackson v. Nicholson406 and
noted that “[t]he fact that VA medical treatment normally involves
interaction with VA personnel . . . does not mean that such treatment
only encompasses the actions of VA employees.”407 Thus, it rejected
the government’s argument that, under § 1151, “medical treatment”
required direct contact with VA employees.408 Finally, the court
reviewed § 1151’s long legislative history and concluded that it did
not include any indication that Congress intended to exclude
“injuries stemming from . . . VA’s failure to properly install and
maintain the equipment necessary to provide health care service”
from coverage under § 1151.409
However, the Federal Circuit also limited its expansion of § 1151’s
coverage by rejecting Mr. Viegas’s argument that any injury at a VA
facility should be covered by § 1151.410 The court explained:
“Gardner makes clear that the statute does not extend to the ‘remote
consequences’ of the hospital care or medical treatment provided by
the VA.”411 However, the court concluded that, in this case, Mr.
Viegas’s injury was not a “remote consequence” and it therefore
reversed and remanded the judgment of the Veterans Court.412
F.

Evaluating the Severity of a Disability

In 2013, the Federal Circuit issued three opinions dealing with
disability evaluations—as compared to zero in 2012 and three in
2011.413 Chapter 4 of Title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations has
“hundreds of ‘diagnostic codes’ detailing how to rate disabilities of
every body part and physical system on a scale from 0% to 100%
disabling.”414 If the diagnostic codes are insufficient, the Code of
Federal Regulations also provides for “extra-schedular ratings and
special monthly compensation to further tailor the monthly

406. 433 F.3d 822 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
407. Viegas, 704 F.3d at 1381.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1383.
411. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 119 (1994)).
412. Id.
413. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1199 (noting that “[t]he relative
attention granted to this area is not surprising, given the complexity of the
regulations in determining how much compensation should be paid to a veteran
each month based upon the severity of his or her disabilities”). See generally Ridgway,
Fresh Eyes, supra note 1 (reviewing veterans law cases in 2012; opinions regarding
disability evaluations are absent from the summary).
414. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1199; see, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1155
(2012) (granting authority to adopt a schedule of ratings ranging from 0% to 100%);
38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2013) (establishing the rating schedule).
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payments.”415 This area of law perfectly illustrates how complex the
veterans law regulatory scheme can be.416
1.

Evaluating PTSD
In Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki,417 the Federal Circuit addressed the
correct regulatory interpretation required to assign a 70% disability
evaluation for PTSD.418 Under the applicable regulations, a veteran’s
service-connected PTSD will be assessed as 50% disabling when it
causes “[o]ccupational and social impairment with reduced reliability
and productivity.”419 This impairment must be
due to such symptoms as:
flattened affect; circumstantial,
circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than
once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands;
impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., retention of
only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks);
impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of
motivation and mood; difficulty in establishing and maintaining
effective work and social relationships.420

However, service-connected PTSD will be assessed as 70% disabling
when it causes “[o]ccupational and social impairment, with deficiencies
in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or
mood.”421 This impairment must be
due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals
which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently
illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or
depression affecting the ability to function independently,
appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as
unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial
disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene;
difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or
a worklike setting); inability to establish and maintain effective
relationships.422

415. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1199; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k)–
(p) (detailing the extra rates of wartime disability compensation).
416. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1051–52 (describing the complexity of the
veterans benefits system as deriving from multiple sources including procedural
issues, medical advances creating increased complexity in diagnosing veterans, and
the congressional practice of increasing the amount of statutes to address specific
issues—e.g., Agent Orange exposure after the Vietnam War).
417. 713 F.3d 112 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
418. Id. at 115–17.
419. Id. at 114 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130).
420. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130).
421. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130).
422. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130).
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Veteran Genaro Vazquez-Claudio was granted service connection
for PTSD that was initially evaluated as 50% disabling.423 He
appealed to the Board, which thoroughly considered his psychiatric
history and noted that he suffered from serious PTSD-related
symptoms, but it concluded that “other than occasional suicidal
ideation, social isolation, and some difficulty adapting to stressful
situations, none of his symptoms corresponded to impairment
greater than 50[%].”424 Accordingly, the Board upheld the initial
assignment of a 50% disability evaluation.425
Mr. Vazquez-Claudio appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that
the Board’s analysis erroneously considered whether his symptoms
matched the list of symptoms associated with a 70% disability
evaluation, rather than considering whether the symptoms he did
have caused deficiencies in “most areas, such as work, school, family
relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.”426 The Veterans Court
stated that the correct legal issue “was not how many ‘areas’ Mr.
Vazquez-Claudio ha[d] demonstrated deficiencies in but, rather, the
frequency, severity, and duration of the psychiatric symptoms, the
length of remissions, and Mr. Vazquez-Claudio’s capacity for
adjustment during periods of remission.”427 Therefore, the Veterans
Court affirmed the Board’s denial of a disability evaluation greater
than 50%.428
At the Federal Circuit, Judge Clevenger noted that the appeal
raised two issues: (1) “whether a 70[%] disability rating is restricted
by its associated list of symptoms,” and (2) “whether the fact-finder
must make findings regarding the veteran’s occupational and social
impairment in ‘most areas’ when evaluating entitlement to a 70[%]
disability rating.”429 On the first issue, Judge Clevenger noted that the
list of symptoms required for a 70% disability evaluation is nonexhaustive, as indicated by the phrase “such as” that precedes it.430
He observed that, for a veteran like Mr. Vazquez-Claudio, whose
symptoms were generally not as severe as those listed in the 70%
category, but who did experience impairment in multiple areas listed
in the 70% category, his claim turned on whether the disability
evaluation should be based on the existence of particular symptoms
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 115, 117.
Id. at 115.
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or a finding of impairment in “most” of the listed “areas” regardless
of symptoms.431
The court reviewed the criteria for finding disability evaluations at
the other levels and concluded that the diagnostic code focused on
“the frequency, severity, and duration of [the] associated
symptoms.”432 It therefore concluded that, although the “frequency,
severity, and duration” of a veteran’s psychiatric symptoms “must play
an important role” in assigning a disability evaluation, “the
regulation’s plain language highlights its symptom-driven nature.”433
The court held that any given disability evaluation for PTSD may only
be assigned if the veteran “demonstrat[es] the particular symptoms
associated with that percentage, or others of similar severity,
frequency, and duration.”434 The court concluded that, to the extent
the Veterans Court had implied that it was irrelevant whether a
veteran demonstrated deficiencies in “most areas,” the Veterans
Court misinterpreted the regulation.435 However, the Federal Circuit
also concluded that the Board had conducted an appropriate analysis
and that the Veterans Court’s misinterpretation was harmless error.436
Accordingly, it affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision.437
In this case, the Federal Circuit clarified the interpretation of a
regulation that is frequently the subject of disputes at all levels of
adjudicating veterans benefits.438 The court essentially set forth a
two-part test that requires the fact finder to:
(1) initially
determine whether the veteran displays symptoms that are of the
type listed in the regulation, and then (2) assess whether the
present symptoms result in occupational and social impairment
with deficiencies in most areas.439 This was a classic veterans case
at the Federal Circuit that did not need to look beyond the
confines of veterans law statutes, regulations, and precedential
caselaw for the required analysis.

431. Id.
432. Id. at 116.
433. Id. at 116–17.
434. Id. at 117.
435. Id. at 117–18.
436. Id. at 118.
437. Id. at 119.
438. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1199 (stating that “[t]he relative
attention granted to [disability ratings] is not surprising, given the complexity of the
regulations in determining how much compensation should be paid to a veteran
each month based upon the severity of his or her disabilities”).
439. Vazquez-Claudio, 713 F.3d at 118.
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2.

Multiple evaluations under one diagnostic code
In Yonek v. Shinseki,440 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans
Court and Board’s denial of a disability evaluation greater than 20%
for a veteran’s service-connected right shoulder disability.441 In 1992,
veteran Stephen F. Yonek was granted service connection for a right
shoulder disability, assessed as 10% disabling, that permanently
limited the motion of his right arm.442 Mr. Yonek received about
fifteen examinations over a seventeen-year period to assess the extent
to which the in-service injury limited his range of motion.443 The
diagnostic code (“DC”) under which his condition was evaluated, DC
5201, assesses limitation of motion in two planes: flexion and
abduction.444 The examinations provided conflicting results in both
planes.445 In September 1999, the RO assessed Mr. Yonek’s right
shoulder disability as 20% disabling.446
Mr. Yonek appealed to the Board, which denied a disability
evaluation greater than 20%.447 He then appealed to the Veterans
Court, arguing that the fact that he experienced limited motion in
both the flexion and abduction planes meant that he was entitled to
receive two separate disability evaluations under DC 5201 and that
his shoulder condition should, as a result, be assessed as more than
20% disabling.448 The Veterans Court disagreed, concluding that
DC 5201 must be interpreted as allowing only a single evaluation for
limitation of motion and that “the plane in which the limitation of
motion manifests itself is irrelevant.”449 Mr. Yonek appealed to the
Federal Circuit.450
In an opinion authored by Judge Dyk, the court conducted a classic
regulatory interpretation analysis. It considered DC 5201 and
concluded that the plain language of the regulation “confirms that a
veteran is only entitled to a single disability rating under diagnostic
code 5201 for each arm that suffers from limited motion at the
shoulder joint.”451 To arrive at this conclusion, the court compared

440. 722 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
441. Id. at 1360.
442. Id. at 1357.
443. Id.
444. See id. (defining flexion as the “elevation of the arm in a forward direction”
and abduction as the “elevation of the arm outward from the side of the body”); see
also 38 C.F.R. § 4.71 (2013) (depicting illustrations of flexion and abduction).
445. Yonek, 722 F.3d at 1357.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1358.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1356.
451. Id. at 1358.
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the language of DC 5201 to other DCs under 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, which
assessed the limitation of motion of the thigh, knee, and elbow, and
concluded that
[i]n light of section 4.71a’s assignment of separate diagnostic codes
to limitation of motion in different planes (or in different
directions within a single plane) of the thigh, knee, and elbow, its
failure to assign separate diagnostic codes to limitation of motion
of the arm at the shoulder joint in the flexion and abduction
planes is noteworthy.452

After determining that none of the other sources cited by Mr.
Yonek supported his argument, the court concluded, in affirming the
decision of the Veteran’s Court, that “the plain language of
diagnostic code 5201 governs, and allows only a single rating for
limitation of motion of an arm.”453 Like Vazquez-Claudio, Yonek is an
example of where veterans law need not borrow mainstream law to
achieve the analysis required to resolve a veterans dispute.454
3.

Disability evaluation analysis for diabetes
In Middleton v. Shinseki,455 the Federal Circuit clarified the correct
analysis to use when a veteran attempts to establish that his serviceconnected diabetes is 40% disabling.456 Under VA’s schedule for
rating service-connected disabilities, diabetes mellitus is assessed as
20% disabling if it requires “insulin and [a] restricted diet” or “[an]
oral hypoglycemic agent and [a] restricted diet.”457 It is assessed as
40% disabling if it requires “insulin, [a] restricted diet, and
regulation of activities.”458
The rating schedule also includes general guidance about its
proper application. Initially, the regulations state that the “General
Policy in Rating” is that “th[e] rating schedule is primarily a guide in
the evaluation of disabilit[ies].”459 The regulations also remind the
reader of the policy they are designed to implement:
452. Id. at 1358–59; see also id. (“Where [an agency] includes particular language
in one section of a [regulation] but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed
that [the agency] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.” (alterations in original) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S.
200, 208 (1993))).
453. Id. at 1359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
454. See supra notes 432–36 and accompanying text (explaining how the court in
Vazquez-Claudio found a solution to the issue at hand without looking outside the
relevant regulations and veterans case law).
455. 727 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
456. Id. at 1173.
457. 38 C.F.R. § 4.119, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7913 (2013).
458. Id.
459. Id. § 4.1.
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It is the defined and consistently applied policy of the Department
of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under a broad
interpretation, consistent, however, with the facts shown in every
case. When after careful consideration of all procurable and
assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the degree of
disability such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant.460

The regulations clarify that “it is not expected . . . that all cases will
show all the findings specified.”461 Finally, the “General Policy in
Rating” states that “[w]here there is a question as to which of two
evaluations shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if
the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required
for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned.”462
Veteran Birdeye L. Middleton was awarded service connection for
diabetes mellitus, evaluated as 20% disabling.463 He sought an
increased disability evaluation, which was denied by the RO.464 The
Board affirmed the denial, finding that although the veteran’s
diabetes caused (1) a restricted diet and (2) regulation of activities,
he did not meet the third regulatory criterion for a 40% evaluation
because his diabetes did not require him to take insulin.465 To
manage his diabetes, Mr. Middleton took oral hypoglycemic agents
and daily injections of a drug that induced the body to secrete
endogenous insulin, and he argued that this was analogous to
requiring insulin.466 The Board disagreed, finding that the “[u]se of
insulin is a necessary element for the 40[%] rating.”467
Mr. Middleton raised the same arguments on appeal and the
Veterans Court affirmed the Board.468 The court held that the plain
language of the diagnostic code required “insulin” and not a
substitute or analogous medication.469 It also rejected the argument
that the veteran’s diabetes “more nearly approximate[d]” the criteria
for a 40% rating.470

460. Id. § 4.3.
461. Id. § 4.21.
462. Id. § 4.7.
463. Middleton v. Shinseki, 727 F.3d 1172, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
464. Id.
465. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.119, DC 7913 (2013)).
466. Id. at 1175.
467. Id. (first alteration in original).
468. Middleton v. Shinseki, No. 10-4222, 2012 WL 20180580 (Vet. App. June 15, 2012).
469. Id. at *2.
470. Id. at *2–3. In making this determination, the court distinguished its
precedent from Camacho v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 360 (2007) which held that a
veteran could receive a 40% disability evaluation for diabetes when he only satisfied
two of the three listed criteria.
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Middleton argued that the
Veterans Court had misinterpreted the regulatory criterion of
“requiring insulin” to require a specific method of obtaining
insulin.471 He asserted that he “required insulin” because the
medications he took caused his body to secrete its own insulin.472 He
argued that limiting the regulation by requiring a specific medication
was inconsistent with the regulatory history, which focused on the
severity of the condition and how well it was controlled.473 He also
claimed that any ambiguity in the rating schedule should be resolved
by referring to symptoms rather than specific medications because
over time those treatments may become obsolete.474 However, the
Federal Circuit relied on the regulation’s plain language and upheld
the Veterans Court decision, concluding that the plain language of
DC 7913 “clearly requires that the veteran is administered insulin.”475
Judge Plager dissented and placed emphasis on the “foundational
concepts [built] into the rating schedule” in 37 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.3, and
4.7, rather than on the plain language of the regulation.476 Noting
that the rating schedule is just a guide, that the law is to be
interpreted broadly and reasonable doubt resolved in favor of the
claimant, and that the higher evaluation will be assigned if there is a
question as to which one applies, Judge Plager concluded that if strict
compliance with the language of the diagnostic codes was always
required, then “§ 4.7 has no meaning.”477
This case provides an example of the tension inherent in the
veterans law system. On one hand, any organization that must
process as many complex applications as VA receives will complete
that task more quickly and consistently if it has clear guidelines to
follow. On the other hand, Congress has explicitly established a
benefits scheme that expresses great solicitude for the special
position that military veterans occupy in our society.478 Many of the
legal disputes in this field result from the grey area created by the
different results achieved by these two competing goals.

471. Middleton, 727 F.3d at 1176.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 1179–81 (Plager, J., dissenting).
477. Id. at 1180.
478. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); see also Ridgway, Why So
Many Remands?, supra note 41, at 117.
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G. Benefits for a Surviving Spouse
When a veteran dies, his or her surviving spouse may be eligible for
dependency and indemnity compensation (“DIC”) if the veteran died
of a service-connected disability.479 One of the conditions for
eligibility is that the couple must have been married for a year or
more before the veteran’s death.480
1.

Burden of proof when establishing a common law marriage
In Burden v. Shinseki,481 the Federal Circuit upheld the Veterans
Court’s determination that “state law, including state law evidentiary
burdens, must be applied in determining the validity of a purported
common law marriage.”482 Louis Burden was a Vietnam veteran who
married his wife in a ceremonial marriage in April 2004.483 He died
two months later and Mrs. Burden subsequently applied for DIC
benefits.484 The RO denied the claim on the basis that Mrs. Burden
was ineligible for benefits because she had been married to the
veteran for less than a year.485 Mrs. Burden appealed, asserting that
the couple had been living in a common law marriage for five years
before the veteran’s death.486 The Board did not find that Mrs.
Burden met the “clear and convincing” standard required under
Alabama law to establish a valid common law marriage, despite the
evidence submitted by Mrs. Burden.487
Mrs. Burden appealed to the Veterans Court, asserting that the
Board erred when it applied Alabama state law and argued that
instead it should have applied the “benefit of the doubt” rule to all
questions related to her eligibility for DIC benefits.488 The Veterans
479. See 38 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (“No compensation shall be paid to the
surviving spouse of a veteran under this chapter unless such surviving spouse was
married to such veteran . . . for one year or more . . . .”).
480. Id.
481. 727 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
482. Id. at 1164.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (requiring a marriage of a year or more for
compensation to be paid to a surviving spouse).
486. Burden, 727 F.3d at 1164.
487. Id. The evidence supporting Mrs. Burden’s claim included lay statements
from friends that the couple had lived “as husband and wife” for at least six years and
“a photocopy of a church raffle ticket” in the names of “Lou and Michele Burden.”
Id. The evidence against the claim included 1998, 1999, and 2002 statements by Mr.
Burden to his private physician that he was single and “did not ‘want to get too
involved,’” that he had a girlfriend, or that his brother was his closest relative. Id.
488. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (“Benefit of the Doubt—The Secretary shall
consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the
Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When
there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any
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Court affirmed the Board decision, concluding that the Board had
properly applied Alabama’s “clear and convincing” standard to the
question of whether the Burdens had entered into a valid common
law marriage before their ceremonial marriage in 2004.489 The court
concluded that the “benefit of the doubt” rule did not apply to the
factual question of whether a common law marriage was valid
because “Congress specifically addressed the standard of proof that
must be applied” when it enacted 38 U.S.C. § 103(c).490
Willie L. Coleman served in the U.S. Army from October 1960 to
December 1963.491 He and Mrs. Coleman were married in November
1969 and had eight children before their divorce in 1982.492 The
veteran died in June 2001 and Mrs. Coleman applied for DIC
benefits, along with a death pension and accrued benefits.493 She
asserted that the couple had reconciled after their divorce and had
lived together in a common law marriage until the veteran’s death.494
The RO denied the claim and, on appeal, the Board upheld the
denial.495 The Board explained that, because the Colemans resided
in Alabama, that state’s law must be applied to the question of
whether they had entered into a valid common law marriage.496 The
Board acknowledged that the Colemans had lived together at times
after their divorce and that Mr. Coleman’s death certificate indicated
that he was married at the time of his death, but the Board
nonetheless concluded that evidence presented to establish a
common law marriage had not met the “clear and convincing proof”
standard required under Alabama law.497
Mrs. Coleman appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that the
Board had failed to consider all the record evidence.498 That court
affirmed the Board’s decision on the basis that a marriage is
substantially subject to social customs and norms and is a local and
domestic prerogative; therefore, the decision of how to define a

issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of
the doubt to the claimant.”).
489. Burden, 727 F.3d at 1165.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. See id. (indicating, for example, that Mr. Coleman lived alone, had stated he
was divorced on a hospitalization report, and Mrs. Coleman maintained she was Mr.
Coleman’s ex-wife on a claim seeking apportionment of VA disability benefits).
498. Id.
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marriage must be left to the state.499 Accordingly, the “benefit of
the doubt” rule does not prevent VA from using the state definitions
of marriage.500
In an opinion authored by Judge Mayer, the Federal Circuit
considered both of these cases and held that “state law, including
state law evidentiary burdens, must be applied in determining the
validity of a purported common law marriage.”501 Both Ms. Burden
and Ms. Coleman acknowledged that 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) required VA
to use Alabama law to determine the validity of their claimed
common law marriages.502 However, they argued that evidentiary
issues should be determined based on federal law and that the
veteran-specific “benefit of the doubt” rule should apply.503
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the plain language of
the statute unambiguously expressed Congress’s intent that the
validity of a marriage be determined by state law.504 The court
observed that Congress had written some statutory provisions of the
veterans benefits system to give VA “broad discretion to determine
the evidence necessary to substantiate . . . the award of VA benefits,”
but that § 103(c) was not one of those provisions.505 In fact, the
requirement that the validity of a marriage be “‘proven’ according to
state law” was so clear that the court saw “nothing in the text of
section 103(c) that would permit . . . VA to disregard [the state law]
standard of proof for establishing a valid common law marriage.”506
The Federal Circuit found this reading consistent with the general
principle that domestic matters such as marriage have usually been
governed by state law, even when federal benefits are implicated.507 It
observed that “marital status, as defined by state law, frequently plays
a prominent role in determining eligibility for benefits from the
federal government” and cited examples from the Social Security Act,
the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act, the Family Medical and Leave
Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act.508
Additionally, the Federal Circuit rejected the claimants’ argument
that the pro-claimant nature of the veterans benefits system and the
need to resolve interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran required
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id. at 1165, 1167–70.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1166.
Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2006)).
Id. at 1167.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
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that VA use federal law to determine the validity of a common law
marriage.509 The court acknowledged the pro-veteran nature of the
benefits system but observed that, in this case, neither competing
interpretation was necessarily more “pro-veteran” than the other.510
If the marriages were determined to be invalid, then the benefits
sought by the veterans’ widows would be awarded to the veterans’
children.511 The Federal Circuit stated: “Although we are required to
resolve interpretive doubt in the veteran’s favor . . . we have no
obligation to construe section 103(c) in a manner that would favor
the interests of a veteran’s purported common law spouse over those
of his children.”512 Therefore, state law must be applied to determine
the validity—although not necessarily other aspects—of a veteran’s
purported common law marriage.513
In general, case law on the burden of proof for establishing a
common law marriage shows that marriage is nearly impossible to
define without looking to state law.514 Therefore, in these cases, VA is
sometimes forced to look beyond the confines of veterans law to
process the claims it receives. Like recent cases involving powers of
attorney, and their interaction with state law,515 this promises to be an
area worth watching in the future.
2.

Enhanced DIC and hypothetical entitlement
In Kernea v. Shinseki,516 the Federal Circuit finally clarified that
“hypothetical entitlement” will not suffice to support a DIC claim.517
The appellant, Flora L. Kernea, was the surviving spouse of World
War II veteran Donald E. Kernea.518 The veteran suffered from
diabetes mellitus that was determined to be service-connected, and
509. Id. at 1169.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1170. The court noted that § 5107(b) would apply to aspects of a
marriage other than its validity, such as its duration, the date the marriage began,
and whether any children were born to the marriage.
514. E.g., id. at 1168.
515. See, e.g., Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118 (2013) (per curiam) (denying a
petition for writ of mandamus where a veteran’s daughter held a durable financial
power of attorney under Maine law for her father for ten years, but VA appointed a
federal fiduciary who took a percentage fee from the veteran’s compensation rather
than directing the veteran’s VA benefits to the daughter); see also Freeman v. Shinseki,
24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that a selection and appointment of a
fiduciary is a matter reviewable by the Board and by the Veterans Court).
516. 724 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
517. See id. at 1377, 1379, 1381 (describing “hypothetical entitlement” as a process
that disregards prior claims during the veteran’s lifetime and determines de novo
whether the veteran was in fact disabled and entitled to DIC benefits).
518. Id. at 1375.

VA.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2013 VETERANS LAW DECISIONS

6/23/2014 2:34 PM

1497

he was evaluated as 100% disabled since December 1965.519 After the
veteran died in February 1969 due to complications from his serviceconnected diabetes, Ms. Kernea applied for and was granted DIC
benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1310.520
In June 2003, Ms. Kernea applied for increased DIC benefits under
38 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2), which applies to a veteran’s surviving spouse
when a veteran received “or was entitled to receive . . . compensation
for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for a
continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding
death.”521 Despite the fact that her late husband had been evaluated
as totally disabled for less than four years at the time of his death, Ms.
Kernea stated that the veteran “was 100% for over 8 years.”522 The
following month, VA denied increased DIC benefits.523
Ms. Kernea continued to pursue her claim on appeal, based on two
main theories.524 First, she alleged that VA rating decisions made
during the veteran’s lifetime contained CUE and that the veteran
should have been evaluated as 100% disabled for at least the last
eight years of his life.525 Second, she argued that her claim was
supported by “hypothetical entitlement”—in other words, she argued
that she could demonstrate, without regard to the actual claims
decisions during the veteran’s lifetime, that her husband had been
totally disabled for the last eight years of his life.526
The Board affirmed VA’s finding that none of the earlier decisions
were the product of CUE, noting “that Ms. Kernea had not identified
a specific error, or even a specific rating decision, that she believes
contains CUE” and that the only support for her allegation of CUE
was her own belief and statements that her husband should have
been evaluated as 100% disabled at an earlier date.527 Regarding the
hypothetical entitlement analysis, the Board noted that VA had
promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.10(f)(3) in 2005 to interpret 38 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a)(2)’s phrase “entitled to receive” as prohibiting claims
Accordingly, the Board
based on hypothetical entitlement.528
undertook a thorough retroactivity analysis using the framework set

519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375–76 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2) (2012)).
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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forth by the Federal Circuit in Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States.529
The Board concluded that retroactive application of § 3.10(f)(3) was
not unlawful and that the regulation, therefore, barred granting any
claims based on hypothetical reliance.530 Accordingly, the Board
denied the claim.531 The Veterans Court affirmed the Board decision
and Ms. Kernea appealed.532
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the history of hypothetical
claims, noting that such claims were permitted in 2000.533 In 2003,
the court had affirmed VA’s interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2)
as barring such claims but also required VA to conduct further
rulemaking to adequately implement the statute.534 In response, VA
promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.10(f)(3), which clarified that
§ 1311(a)(2)’s phrase “entitled to receive” prohibited hypothetical
claims.535 This rule became effective on December 2, 2005.536 The
case at hand required the Federal Circuit to determine whether
hypothetical claims that had been filed before the amended
regulation became effective were also prohibited.537
To do this, the court analyzed the retroactive application of
§ 3.10(f)(3) using the three-part Princess Cruises analysis.538 Like the
Board, the Federal Circuit first determined that when Ms. Kernea
filed her claim in 2003, the law permitting hypothetical claims was
already changing and, therefore, § 3.10(f)(3) did not effect a
substantial change.539 Second, the court found that Ms. Kernea had
not relied on the prior interpretation of the statute because “there is
nothing [she] could have done differently had she known the effect
of the 2005 amendment when she filed her claim” in 2003.540 Finally,
the court concluded “‘familiar considerations of fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations’” did not prohibit
retroactive application of the statute because, as it had previously
found, “it was already apparent when Ms. Kernea filed her claim in
2003 that hypothetical entitlement claims would no longer be
529. 397 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
530. Kernea, 724 F.3d at 1376.
531. Id. at 1377.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 1377–78.
534. Id. at 1378 (citing Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans
Affairs, 314 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 1379–82.
539. Id. at 1379.
540. Id. at 1381 (quoting Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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permitted under § 1311(a)(2).”541
Therefore, “[u]nder these
circumstances, Ms. Kernea must be deemed to have had fair notice
that her hypothetical entitlement claim might be disallowed.”542
H. Procedure
In 2013, the Federal Circuit published five opinions concerning
the procedures used to process veterans claims. As discussed in Part
I,543 veterans benefits law is procedurally complex and it is therefore
predictable that many of the Veterans Court decisions reviewed by
the Federal Circuit deal with issues of procedure.544
1.

Effect of revising a prior decision on subsequent final decisions
In Pirkl v. Shinseki,545 the Federal Circuit examined the effect of
revising a prior decision based on a finding of CUE and determined
what effect such a revision would have on subsequent final decisions
regarding the same disability.546 A final decision by a RO or the
Board may be collaterally attacked, even decades later, if the
appellant establishes that there was CUE in the decision.547 In such a
case, the claimant must provide “some degree of specificity as to what
the alleged error is and, unless it is the kind of error . . . that, if true,
would be CUE on its face, persuasive reasons must be given as to why
the result would have been manifestly different but for the alleged
error.”548 A determination of CUE “must be based on the record . . .
that existed at the time of the prior [RO] . . . decision.”549 Because of
this requirement, it is well established that a failure to fulfill the duty
to assist cannot constitute CUE.550
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. See supra notes 45–48, 77 and accompanying text (explaining that complex
bureaucracy is overburdening the processes surrounding the laws and regulations).
See generally Ridgway, New Complexities, supra note 25, at 252 (discussing procedurally
complex rules meant to cover all possible fact patterns).
544. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1207 (“Whereas most of the
other published decisions of the [Federal Circuit in 2011] were reviews of
unpublished, single-judge [Veterans Court] decisions, it is indicative of the
importance of procedure to the veterans benefits system that three of the four cases
on procedure reviewed divided, en banc opinions by the [Veterans Court].”).
545. 718 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
546. See id. at 1380 (vacating the lower court’s decision for failing to consider the
effects of regulations governing a reduction of a total disability rating).
547. Id. at 1384; see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 696–98
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a final decision by an RO may be attacked collaterally
by a claim of CUE).
548. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 44 (1993).
549. Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 314 (1992).
550. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377, 387 (1994). Caffrey was cited with
approval in Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc), for the
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Veteran Pirkl was awarded service connection for schizophrenia in
1949.551 His condition was initially evaluated as 10% disabling and
increased to 100% disabling in 1952.552 His disability evaluation was
reduced to 70% in 1953, then to 50% in 1956, and further reduced to
30% in 1966.553 After additional procedural history, his condition was
again evaluated as 100% disabling, effective November 1988.554
In 2001, Mr. Pirkl filed a motion to revise the three RO decisions
that reduced his disability evaluation from 100% in 1953, 1956, and
1966.555 Eventually, in August 2006, the Board concluded that the
1953 RO decision that reduced Mr. Pirkl’s disability evaluation from
100% to 70% did contain CUE.556 However, the RO decision that
implemented the Board’s decision concluded that the Board’s
finding of CUE did not affect the subsequent rating decisions, thus
leaving in place the 1956 and 1966 reductions.557 Mr. Pirkl appealed,
asserting that the CUE finding also affected the finality of the
subsequent 1956 and 1966 reductions and that his 100% rating
should have been continued from 1953 to 1988.558 The Board
disagreed, noting that Mr. Pirkl’s original CUE motion and appeal
had not included a challenge to those later decisions.559
Mr. Pirkl appealed to the Veterans Court, which affirmed the
Board decision.560 The court observed that the 1956 and 1966
decisions were independently based on newly acquired VA medical
examinations and found, therefore, that neither the 1956 decision
nor the 1966 decision (and the 1967 Board decision that affirmed
and subsumed it) were premised on the CUE that had been
identified in the 1953 decision.561
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Pirkl argued, first, that the
Veterans Court misinterpreted the statutory provision establishing
that the revision of a prior decision on the basis of a finding of CUE
“has the same effect as if the [revised] decision had been made on

proposition that failure to fulfill the duty to assist does not constitute CUE, id. at
1343–45; see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d) (2013) (stating that failure to fulfill the duty
to assist is not CUE).
551. Pirkl, 718 F.3d at 1380.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 1381–82.
560. Id. at 1382.
561. Id.
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the date of the prior decision.”562 In the alternative, he argued that
the 1956 and 1966 reductions were void because the revised 1953
decision triggered the regulatory provision requiring “material
improvement” before a 100% evaluation can be reduced.563 The
Secretary argued that the 1956 RO decision and the 1967 Board
decision were independent final decisions and that, because there
had been no independent finding of CUE in those decisions, they
were unaffected by a finding of CUE in the 1953 decision.564
The Federal Circuit relied on the section of the statute stating that
when CUE is established in a prior decision, the revised decision
must be treated as if it had been made on the date of the original
decision.565 The court concluded that “[t]his necessarily implies
retroactive effect.”566 It therefore held that, although a CUE finding
will not necessarily initiate a “chain reaction” and nullify subsequent
decisions, when VA implements a finding of CUE, it is “required to
consider the effects of that CUE finding on the legal and factual basis
of . . . subsequent rating decisions.”567 In the case at hand, that meant
that VA was required to consider the applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 3170
from 1949 and its successor regulations to determine whether there
had been a finding of “material improvement” in Mr. Pirkl’s
condition before the 1956 and 1966 reductions.568
2.

Remand or reversal at the Veterans Court
In Deloach v. Shinseki,569 the Federal Circuit clarified when it is
appropriate for the Veterans Court to reverse, rather than remand, a
matter before it.570 The Federal Circuit first addressed whether it had
jurisdiction to hear the two consolidated cases because both veterans
were appealing from Veterans Court decisions that had remanded
their claims.571
Under most circumstances, a remand is not
considered a final decision, and therefore is not ripe for Federal
Circuit review.572 However, because the Federal Circuit’s statutory
grant of jurisdiction over Veterans Court decisions is worded slightly

562. Id. at 1383 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5109A(b) (2006)).
563. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.170 (1949)).
564. Id.
565. Id. at 1384.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 1384–85.
569. 704 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
570. See id. at 1376, 1379, 1381 (expressing the confusion that was finally
addressed by Congress in 2002).
571. Id. at 1375.
572. Id. at 1375–76.
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differently than the statutes conferring jurisdiction to other federal
appellate courts, the Federal Circuit has recognized a narrow
exception in which a non-final decision is appealable.573 This
exception only applies when three conditions, known as the Williams
conditions, are met.574
The Federal Circuit concluded that the exception applied in the
two consolidated cases appealed in Deloach, in part because the
Veterans Court explicitly concluded that it lacked the authority to
issue a reversal—thus providing the Federal Circuit with an
appealable legal issue within its jurisdiction.575
Despite the
applicability of the exception, however, the Federal Circuit went on
to conclude that remand was appropriate in the appealed
consolidated cases.576
This decision is notable because the Federal Circuit went out of its
way to make the point that the Veterans Court is fully authorized to
reverse Board decisions, despite the fact that the Veterans Court
traditionally reverses less than 6% of the Board decisions it reviews.577
In fact, it is hard to interpret the amount of space devoted to the
issue—almost a full page of a 10-page decision—as anything other
than the Federal Circuit intentionally making a statement to the
Veterans Court.578 The decision reviews in detail the language of the
Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, which explicitly empowered the
Veterans Court to “reverse adverse findings of material fact that are
‘clearly erroneous.’”579 Because that power was already implicit in the
Veteran Court’s foundation, this decision is easily interpreted—with

573. Id. at 1376. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (conferring jurisdiction
over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court”), with 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a)
(“After a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is
entered in a case, any party to the case may obtain a review of the decision . . . .”).
574. Deloach, 704 F.3d at 1376. The Williams conditions, derived from Williams v.
Principi, 275 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), are:
(1) there must have been a clear and final decision of a legal issue that (a) is
separate from the remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the remand
proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court, would render the remand
proceedings unnecessary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must
adversely affect the party seeking review; and, (3) there must be a substantial
risk that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand
proceeding may moot the issue.
Id. at 1364 (footnotes omitted).
575. Deloach, 704 F.3d at 1377–78.
576. Id. at 1381.
577. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 41, at 155; see Deloach, 704 F.3d at 1380.
578. See Deloach, 704 F.3d at 1379 (using direct language and clarifying specific
powers the Veterans Court has).
579. Id.
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ample support in the Congressional Record—as intending to spur
the Veterans Court to issue more reversals.580
3.

Appeal of a bifurcated claim to the Veterans Court
In Tyrues v. Shinseki, a case with a long and complex procedural
history, the Federal Circuit examined the finality of Board decisions
that bifurcate one claim into several components.581 The court
determined that the proper time to appeal each component of a
claim is within the appeals period for that individual component,
rather than the claim as a whole.582 Once an appeal is decided by the
Board, it may be appealed to the Veterans Court within 120 days.583
However, Board decisions routinely address multiple issues, and any
given decision may remand some—but not necessarily all—of the
matters addressed.584 When this occurs, it is not always clear how
much of the Board decision is final and immediately appealable to
the Veterans Court.585
Mr. Tyrues served in the Persian Gulf War and developed tonsillitis
and pneumonia three years later.586 In 1995, he applied for
compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1110, and, in 1996, he
applied for compensation for Persian Gulf Syndrome under 38 U.S.C.
§ 1117.587 The two matters were handled together by the RO and the
Board, with the Board denying direct compensation and remanding
the question of Persian Gulf Syndrome in 1998.588 The RO denied the
Persian Gulf claim again and the Board affirmed the denial in 2004.589
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Tyrues tried to raise
arguments under § 1110 even though the claim he submitted under
that section had been denied in 1998.590 In a sharply divided
opinion, the en banc Veterans Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the § 1110 arguments.591 Six of the seven judges
agreed that the two theories of compensation were part of the same

580. See id. (“It was Congress’ intent to clarify the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims’ authority and expressly instruct the court that it had the power to reverse.”).
581. 732 F.3d 1351, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
582. Id.
583. Id. at 1357.
584. Id. at 1355.
585. See id. (explaining that the denial portion of a mixed decision is a final
decision that may be immediately reviewed on appeal to the Veterans Court unless
the denial portion is inextricably intertwined with the portion ordering a remand).
586. Id. at 1353.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id. at 1354.
590. Id. (referring to Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 166, 170 (2009) (en banc)).
591. Tyrues, 23 Vet. App. at 168.
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claim because they pertained to the same disability.592 That majority
divided, however, on the issue of how to interpret the Veterans
Court’s jurisdiction in the frequent cases in which the Board issues a
decision denying one theory of how to establish benefits for a
medical condition but remands for a different theory.593 The
majority held that, in such a situation, the denied theory must be
appealed immediately.594 The majority reasoned that requiring an
immediate appeal would provide claimants with prompt review.595 It
also stated that such decisions do provide claimants with reasonable
notice that the denied theory must be immediately appealed because
each decision includes an appended form providing the claimant
with notice of his or her appellate rights.596
The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority’s assertion that
all claimants would reasonably understand the need to immediately
appeal one aspect of a claim when another aspect was being
remanded for further proceedings.597 The dissent also argued that
the theory-based rule of finality could not be workably applied to
many of the procedural provisions in Title 38 that are written in
terms of “claims.”598
In a decision by Chief Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit rejected the
veteran’s argument that the finality of a Board decision could be
indeterminate and, therefore, subject to the claimant’s discretion as
to when to appeal.599 Although the central dispute at the Veterans
Court was how to handle a single claim that had been bifurcated, the
Federal Circuit described the situation as involving two separate

592. Id. at 191. The Veterans Court had previously held that the scope of the
claim is not limited to the theory originally advanced by the lay claimant:
For purposes of the claim and its adjudication, it matters little that the
appellant believes his symptoms should be diagnosed as [one condition] if
the medical evidence establishes that his symptoms are actually something
different. And, the fact that the appellant may be wrong about the nature of
his condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate
the claim.
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2009); see also Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.
App. 232, 256–57 (2007) (“[I]t is the Secretary who knows the provisions of title 38
and can evaluate whether there is potential under the law to compensate an averred
disability based on a sympathetic reading of the material in a pro se submission.”).
593. Tyrues, 23 Vet. App. at 172–74.
594. Id. at 179–82.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 194 (Lance, J., dissenting).
598. Id. at 195 (“[T]he majority opinion fails to address any of these [procedural]
issues [and] puts the Court on course to simply mark out every instance of the word
‘claim’ in title 38 and pencil in ‘theory’ in order to make the statute functional.”).
599. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 631 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011).
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claims.600 This may have been because Mr. Tyrues himself did not
accept any of the competing Veterans Court’s opinions but, instead,
argued that veterans have the discretion either to immediately appeal
a denial in a “mixed decision” or to wait until the remanded portion
is resolved and then appeal both matters together.601
The court relied heavily on Judge Rader’s 2011 decision in Elkins v.
Gober602 to hold that “[s]eparate claims are separately appealable.”603 As
to the critical issue of timing, the decision emphasized that “[p]ublic
policy supports allowing veterans to appeal denied claims as quickly as
possible.”604 It then reasoned that this “[wa]s best achieved by allowing
appeals once the Board makes an individual claim final.”605 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit concluded that “all final decisions, even those
appearing as part of a mixed decision, must be appealed within 120 days
from the date of mailing of notice of the decision.”606
Notably, the Federal Circuit did not venture into the practical and
interpretive disagreements that divided the Veterans Court.607
Instead, the decision “encourage[d] the Veterans Court to exercise
its jurisdiction as needed to promote judicial efficiency and fairness
when handling mixed decisions.”608
In Henderson v. Shinseki,609 the Supreme Court held that the 120-day
deadline for filing an appeal with the Veterans Court was “an
important procedural rule” but not jurisdictional and, therefore, did
not preclude equitable tolling.610 In 2011, in light of Henderson,611 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tyrues, vacated the opinion, and
remanded the case for reconsideration.612 The petition for certiorari
was filed by new counsel, who framed the issue as it had been
analyzed at the Veterans Court: “[W]hether the time limit in [38
U.S.C. §] 7266(a) requires the filing of an appeal when only one of
600. Id. at 1382.
601. Id. at 1383. The misstatement of the posture of the case may be related to
the phrasing of the appellant’s brief, which is phrased throughout in terms of the
Veterans Court’s jurisdiction over “claim(s).” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9–10,
Tyrues, 631 F.3d 1380 (No. 2010-7011), 2010 WL 617385.
602. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
603. Tyrues, 631 F.3d at 1383.
604. Id. at 1384.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).
607. See Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 166, 172–74 (2009) (en banc) (discussing
the divided majority opinion on the interpretation of the court’s jurisdiction in cases
where the Board has issued a decision denying one theory but remanding for
another theory).
608. Tyrues, 631 F.3d at 1384.
609. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
610. Id. at 1206.
611. Id.
612. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011).
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two theories of entitlement had been finally adjudicated, or whether
the veteran has the discretion to defer an appeal until all theories of
entitlement have been finally decided.”613 The Federal Circuit
vacated the Veterans Court’s judgment and remanded the decision
for consideration of whether Henderson required a different result.614
On remand, the Veterans Court found that Mr. Tyrues had not
presented any reason to equitably toll the filing deadline and
dismissed the appeal from the September 1998 Board decision.615
Mr. Tyrues again appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Judge Taranto wrote for the majority, noting that the appeal raised
two issues of statutory interpretation.616 The issues were:
When the Board has clearly rejected a request for benefits under
one statutory standard and designated that rejection as subject to
immediate appeal, while separately remanding the matter for
consideration of the claimant’s request for benefits on other
statutory grounds, (1) can the denial be appealed immediately, i.e.,
without waiting for completion of the remand, and (2) must the
denial be appealed immediately, i.e., within the 120 days specified
in section 7266(a), in the absence of equitable tolling?617

On the first issue, the Federal Circuit held that a veteran could appeal
the denial portion of a mixed decision immediately.618 It concluded that
such a denial “is a final decision available for Veterans Court review
where the Board makes clear the finality of that denial.”619 The court
noted that this rule “fits the statutory language and context” and also
that it placed the onus on the Board to provide clarity about when a
decision was final.620 On the second issue, the court relied on the plain
language of the statute and held that “[a] veteran not only can appeal
immediately, but must bring any appeal from the denial portion within
the 120-day period allowed by statute.”621
On both issues, the Federal Circuit found additional support for its
holdings by comparing mixed Board decisions to partial-case
remands in federal district courts, which “suppl[y] an instructive
model for interpreting the provisions governing the analogous

613. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyrues, 132 S. Ct. 75 (No. 10-1405), 2011
WL 1853076.
614. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 467 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
615. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 31, 33–34 (2012).
616. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 732 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 1356.
620. Id.
621. Id. at 1357.
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situation here.”622 The Federal Circuit noted that, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a district court had the authority to
“‘direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than
all, claims or parties,” if appropriate, and that such a final judgment
was appealable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1295.623
Judge Newman dissented, stating that the majority’s holding was
“incorrect procedural law in any context, and [wa]s particularly inapt
as applied to veterans’ claim procedure.”624 She opined that veterans
should receive the more flexible treatment afforded by administrative
proceedings, even at the judicial level of the Veterans Court.625 She
also stated that, even if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could be
applied to appeals from Board decisions, the requirements of Rule
54(b) were not met in the case at hand.626
4.

Equitable tolling of deadline to appeal to the Veterans Court
In Sneed v. Shinseki,627 the Federal Circuit held that “attorney
abandonment can justify equitably tolling the deadline for filing an
appeal to the Veterans Court.”628 Equitable tolling of the deadline to
file an appeal at the Veterans Court may be applied
when circumstances preclude[] a timely filing despite the exercise
of due diligence, such as (1) a mental illness rendering one
incapable of handling one’s own affairs or other extraordinary
circumstances beyond one’s control, (2) reliance on the incorrect
statement of a VA official, or (3) a misfiling at the regional office or
the Board.629

Marva Sneed, the surviving spouse of veteran Reginald A. Sneed,
received a Board decision denying her claim for survivor benefits.630
She “promptly” contacted an attorney to discuss representing her
before the Veterans Court.631 One day before the deadline for filing
an appeal, she received a letter from the attorney she had
contacted.632 The letter informed Ms. Sneed that the attorney would
be unable to take the case and that she should seek an opinion from
another attorney or file a notice of appeal herself.633 The letter also
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.

Id.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)).
Id. at 1359 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1366.
737 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 721.
Bove v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 136, 140 (2011).
Sneed, 737 F.3d at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
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incorrectly identified the deadline to appeal the decision as being
two days after the actual deadline.634
Twenty-nine days after the deadline, Ms. Sneed filed a notice of
appeal with the Veterans Court.635 In a letter that followed the
notice, she stated that she had tried without success to find another
attorney who would take the case.636 She wrote: “I thought I had an
attorney, this attorney was sent all of my papers about this appeal in a
timely manner, in fact I contact[ed] the attorney office as soon as I
got my decision letter. I even ke[pt] in contact with the attorney
office.”637 Ms. Sneed concluded that she did not believe it was her
fault that she had missed the filing deadline.638
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Sneed retained an attorney and argued that
her reliance on the first attorney had been reasonable and that the
attorney’s conduct created “extraordinary circumstances beyond [Ms.
Sneed’s] control,” justifying equitable tolling of the filing deadline.639
The Veterans Court disagreed and dismissed the appeal.640 The court
noted that the attorney who declined to take the case had informed
Ms. Sneed that she could file the notice of appeal herself.641 The
court therefore concluded that the late filing “evidence[d] general
negligence or procrastination” and precluded equitable tolling.642
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Ms. Sneed argued that the
Veterans Court “incorrectly interpreted § 7266(a) by ruling out
attorney abandonment as a potential basis for equitable tolling.”643
The majority reviewed the law on equitable tolling of the deadline to
file an appeal at the Veterans Court, noting that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Henderson had emphasized the “dramatic” difference
between “‘ordinary civil litigation’ and the system for adjudicating
veterans benefits claims.”644 The court concluded that the Veterans
Court had erred when it failed to ask whether the attorney’s conduct
constituted extraordinary circumstances and that the court
“improperly treated the listed examples . . . as the exclusive
‘parameters’ of equitable tolling.”645 The Federal Circuit criticized

634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 723
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725 (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205–06 (2011)).
Id. at 726.
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the Veterans Court for “improperly fail[ing] to consider whether
attorney misconduct . . . may constitute a basis for equitable
tolling”646 and held that attorney abandonment could indeed support
equitably tolling the 120-day deadline.647
Judge Prost wrote a strongly worded dissent, asserting that “[t]he
majority’s pronouncements on attorney abandonment are pure
dicta.”648 She believed that attorney abandonment was irrelevant to
the late notice of appeal (“NOA”) because any misinformation Ms.
Sneed received from the attorney only explained two days of delay,
rather than the thirty days it took Ms. Sneed to file the NOA.649 She
also observed that the majority’s holding seemed unnecessary
because “the Veterans Court has long recognized that egregious
attorney misconduct—including abandonment—can justify equitable
tolling of the NOA deadline.”650
IV. THEMES RAISED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 2013
VETERANS LAW CASES
Once under judicial review, VA was forced to recognize that a
number of the procedures it had developed during its many years of
“splendid isolation” had not kept up with developing legal norms and
procedures.651 In its early years, the Veterans Court established new
duties for VA in order to bring the Agency into compliance with
modern notions of due process.652 Many of these obligations,
however, also had the effect of slowing down the process of claims
adjudication and increasing the complexity of the process.653
646. Id.
647. Id. at 728.
648. Id. at 729 (Prost, J., dissenting).
649. Id.
650. Id. at 731.
651. Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into the World of Meaningful Due
Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 44 (1994).
652. In Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991), the court held that Board
decisions were not to be based on the medical opinion of the physician on the threemember panel—which was often relied on but not explained—but could only be
based on independent medical evidence, id. at 175; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)
(2012) (“Each decision of the Board shall include—(1) a written statement of the
Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those findings and
conclusions, on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record . . . .”).
But see Hagel & Horan, supra note 651, at 48 (arguing that the Veterans Court only
enforced already existing due process requirements on the Board, which were often
ignored by VA and its regulations).
653. Ridgway, New Complexities, supra note 25, at 268 (“[T]he overall value of
judicial review has also been questioned, primarily because the adjudication process
takes dramatically longer to complete without a corresponding increase in
accuracy.”); see also Fox, supra note 47, at 342 (discussing the increased criticism
resulting from time-consuming reviews since judicial review began).
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Despite judicial review, and early changes to conform to more
mainstream law,654 veterans benefits law has largely developed
independently since 1998, when the Federal Circuit established that
the unique nature of the pro-claimant veterans benefits system
precluded borrowing legal concepts from other areas of the law.655
In 1997, the Veterans Court decided a case called Hodge v. West,656
in which it adopted a legal test from social security benefits case law
to interpret the regulatory term “new and material evidence.”657 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit emphatically overturned the case,
concluding that the Veterans Court had failed to defer to the
reasonable agency definition of a statutory term.658 More broadly, the
court held that “the test set forth by the [Veterans Court] may be
inconsistent with the underlying purposes and procedures of the
veterans’ benefits award scheme.”659
The Federal Circuit discussed this issue at length, emphasizing that
social security benefits were “an entirely different benefits scheme”
and that the veterans benefits system had a “unique character and
structure” that was designed by Congress to be explicitly proclaimant, even after the establishment of judicial review.660 It
criticized the Veterans Court for “inexplicably borrow[ing] a
definition of materiality . . . rather than relying on the character of
and precedents from the veterans’ benefits system it was charged by
Congress to review.”661 The court expressed concern that, “where the
system of awarding compensation is so uniquely pro-claimant, the
importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries
great weight.”662 It speculated that using the test established by the
Veterans Court would “undermine public confidence, particularly
among veterans” and that it could even “undermine the operation of
the veterans’ benefits system by altering its traditional character.”663
Given such a strong criticism of a decision based on other,
potentially analogous, areas of law, it is unsurprising that veterans law
following Hodge evolved primarily as dictated by the Federal Circuit in
that case: by “relying on the character of and precedents from the
654. See Hagel & Horan, supra note 651, at 46–49 (discussing changes the
reviewing courts imposed on VA and the Board).
655. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
656. 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
657. Id. at 1357–58.
658. Id. at 1360.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 1361–64.
661. Id. at 1361.
662. Id. at 1363.
663. Id. at 1363–64.
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veterans’ benefits system it was charged by Congress to review.”664
Therefore, other than minor deviations, veterans law has historically
developed in relative isolation.
CONCLUSION
The year 2013 saw an increasing retreat from the isolation in which
veterans law had developed since Hodge. Some of the Federal
Circuit’s cases in 2013 had no need to venture outside the confines of
veterans law for their holdings. For example, the court in Hall used a
classic regulatory analysis that assessed the plain language of the
regulation, reviewed examples provided in the rule to determine
context, confirmed that the suggested interpretation was consistent
with the rest of § 3.304(f), and looked at regulatory history as
demonstrated by the Agency’s response to comments during the
notice and comment period for the proposed regulation. Likewise,
the court in Viegas and Yonek relied on straightforward statutory or
regulatory analysis to reach their holdings.
In other decisions, the Federal Circuit ventured further afield.
Some cases, such as those involving common law marriages or
fiduciary appointments, require VA to consider state law. However,
the court did not always restrict itself to considering outside law only
on essential issues. In Burden, for example, the Federal Circuit went
beyond the need to consult Alabama’s law on the validity of common
law marriages. It cited the Social Security Act, the Federal Coal Mine
and Safety Act, the Family Medical and Leave Act, and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, as examples of analogous situations when state law
defines marital status to determine eligibility for federal benefits.
Likewise, the court’s decision in Tyrues could easily have conducted
its analysis and reached the same result without resorting to a
comparison to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Perhaps the most radical departure from strict reliance on veterans
benefits precedent was the court’s decision in AZ. As noted above,
the majority’s analysis relied on sources including: common law
evidentiary rules as developed by the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts, and as codified in the FRE; the history of criminal
rape trials, legislative reports, and criminal law from various
jurisdictions; and holdings from both civil and criminal courts about
when the failure to make a report is inadmissible. This wide range of
sources beyond the precedents of veterans law, combined with
explicit acknowledgement of the unique nature of the pro-claimant
664. Id. at 1361.
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veterans benefits system, would be a very interesting direction for the
Federal Circuit to take in the future.
It is worth seriously considering whether it is truly veteran-friendly
and pro-claimant for veterans law to remain isolated from
mainstream legal systems and processes. Given that the current
system is not working very efficiently or effectively,665 perhaps it is
time for the courts to look beyond veterans law to see if principles or
processes from other legal regimes may have useful lessons.
At the Veterans Court’s Twelfth Judicial Conference, Justice Scalia
noted that the “thumb on the scale” that is supposed to apply to
veterans benefits adjudications more often resembles a “fist” on the
scale.666 Even if the veterans benefits system starts to look beyond its
current “splendid isolation” to see whether other legal systems may
provide useful lessons, veterans are still viewed with much solicitude,
and this is unlikely to change.

665. See James Dao, Criticism of Veterans Affairs Secretary Mounts over Backlog in
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19
/us/shinseki-faces-mounting-criticism-over-backlog-of-benefit-claims.html?smid=pl-share
(noting that over 600,000 VA claims have been pending for more than 125 days).
666. Justice Scalia Headlines the Twelfth CAVC Judicial Conference, VETERANS L.J., Summer
2013, at 1, available at http://www.cavcbar.net/Summer%202013%20VLJ%20Web.pdf.
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ADDENDUM
This year’s Article continues the practice of providing a statistical
addendum of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence for the year.667
Table 1: Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions, January 1, 2013, to
December 31, 2013668
Result

Number of Cases

Affirmed

15

Reversed and remanded

1

Vacated and remanded

5

Total

21

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the veterans law cases at the
Federal Circuit in terms of the court’s agreement with the Veterans
Court. The 71.4% affirmance rate (15 of 21) is higher than the
66.7% rate (8 of 12 decisions) in 2012, fairly similar to the 72.7% rate
(8 of 11 decisions affirmed on the merits) in 2011, and lower than
the 78.6% rate (11 of 14) in 2010.669 As noted in previous years, in
the realm of veterans law, the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court
continue to have a relatively high rate of agreement.670 The general
affirmance rate for regional circuits reviewing district courts or
agency decisions is 62%.671

667. E.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258. To the extent these tables and graphs
use the same format, the detailed explanations of the data will not be repeated here.
As noted in past years, there is room for additional data gathering and analysis.
668. This Table does not include the Federal Circuit’s Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) decisions.
669. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258; Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at
1224–25; Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1096–97.
670. See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1224 (noting the relatively high
rate of agreement between the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court).
671. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–59.
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Table 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge, January 1, 2013, to
December 31, 2013672
Number
Judge

Number

Number

Percentage

Authored

Participated in

Authored

Number of

Authored

Separate

Generating

Opinions

Separate
Opinions

Rader

1

6

16.7%

0

0

Newman

0

7

0.0%

2

0

Lourie

2

4

50.0%

1

1

Dyk

2

8

25.0%

0

1

Prost

2

5

40.0%

0

0

Moore

0

4

0.0%

1

0

O’Malley

0

4

0.0%

0

0

Reyna

4

4

100.0%

0

1

Wallach

2

3

66.7%

0

1

Taranto

1

4

25.0%

1

1

Chen

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Hughes

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Mayer

2

3

66.7%

0

0

Plager

1

2

50.0%

1

0

Clevenger

3

5

60.0%

0

0

Schall

0

2

0.0%

0

0

Gajarsa

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Linn

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Bryson

1

2

50.0%

0

1

Per Curiam

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Visiting

0

0

0.0%

0

0

Total

21

63

—

6

6

672. This Table does not include EAJA decisions.
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Figure 1: Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, 2000 to 2013673
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Figure 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of
Dispositions by Judges Reviewing the Veterans Court, 2006 to 2013674
450

386

400
301

350
300

219

250
200
150

148

143

14

15

17

23

2010

2011

2012

2013

128
88

85

100
50

13

28

21

27

2007

2008

2009

0
2006

Precedential Opinions

Total Terminations by Judges

673. This Figure includes EAJA decisions, which are included in the data from
earlier years and in the comparative data.
674. This Figure includes EAJA decisions, which are included in the data from
earlier years and in the comparative data.

